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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders
and educators. CED is non-profit, non-parti-
san, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady eco-
nomic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increased productiv-
ity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is di-
rected under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each
instance is to be from the standpoint of the
general welfare and not from that of any
special political or economic group.” The
committee is aided by a Research Advisory
Board of leading social scientists and by a
small permanent professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pend-
ing specific legislative proposals; its purpose is
to urge careful consideration of the objectives
set forth in this statement and of the best means
of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the Re-
search and Policy Committee the privilege of
submitting individual comments for publica-
tion.
The recommendations presented herein are
those of the trustee members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcom-
mittee. They are not necessarily endorsed by other
trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee members,
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment has taken a strong, on-going interest in
the quality of education provided by our
public schools. In 1994, we published Putting
Learning First: Governing and Managing the
Public Schools for High Achievement, which em-
phasized the need to reorder educational
priorities and emphasize learning and
achievement as schools’ primary mission. In
2001, we released our report, Measuring What
Matters: Using Assessment and Accountability to
Improve Student Learning, which stressed the
importance of testing and assessment to
school improvement efforts.
Many of the changes advocated in these
statements have been implemented, particu-
larly regarding testing and assessment. Fol-
lowing the No Child Left Behind Act of
2002, the nation’s education policy placed
new emphasis on outcomes and on the ac-
countability of public schools to achieve them.
But, in CED’s view, the nation’s public
schools are yet to be managed in a way that
lends itself to achieving those outcomes.
This paper explains why, and what we can
do about it. As business and education lead-
ers, we are concerned that our schools are
financed, budgeted, and operated using a
system that no other organization would
adopt, let alone emulate. For example,
under No Child Left Behind, individual
schools can be shut down if they fail to
achieve certain test scores. But the principals
of those schools typically cannot buy new
supplies of copier paper without approval
from central administrators. Similarly, logic
suggests that schools with poor test results
would be allowed to hire better teachers. But
the structure of work rules in most teacher
contracts gives teachers with experience
(seniority) the right to pick where they work,
allowing them to avoid the more difficult
schools. Teacher pay structures are largely
determined by seniority, rather than perfor-
mance or market conditions. And most
school districts do not have the basic data
systems that would allow them to make
rational investments or program decisions.
This statement addresses these and other
problems related to public school finance—
the system that governs public school re-
source allocation, budgeting, and manage-
ment. While there are vested interests in
both school administrations and teacher
unions that oppose some of these changes,
there are already signs of reform underway.
We urge that the business community ac-
tively involve itself in pushing these reforms
forward, in order to bring a new culture of
cost-effectiveness and achievement to our
nation’s public schools.
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1Every year the United States spends over
$400 billion on its public elementary and sec-
ondary schools. K-12 education represents the
biggest item in state and local budgets. Yet
those financial resources are not managed in
ways that encourage and reinforce efforts to
improve educational outcomes. As a result,
the massive American investment in its
schools is not yielding the high level of stu-
dent achievement that it should. 
The Committee for Economic
Development (CED) calls for transforming
education finance so that funding policies are
aligned with standards-based reform efforts to
improve the nation’s public schools. Money is
a powerful motivator of behavior. Harnessing
spending to school improvement strategies
can help spur the systemic change needed to
raise academic achievement. Redesigning
funding policies—to use resources more
effectively, to make teacher pay more reflec-
tive of labor market realities, to create incen-
tives for improved performance, and to link
funding levels to the costs of meeting educa-
tional standards—is an essential step in the
process of transforming schools into high per-
formance organizations.
Over the past two decades, America
embarked on a campaign to improve public
schools for all our nation’s children.
Educators slowly but unmistakably turned
away from their traditional concern with
inputs and rules to focus on the outcomes of
schooling. States adopted standards-based
guidelines for what students should know and
be able to do. Policy makers worked at align-
ing various parts of the education system,
including curriculum, teacher training, assess-
ment, and accountability, to these standards.
Legislators passed laws authorizing the cre-
ation of charter schools to encourage innova-
tion and improve performance by breaking
the historic link between public funding of
public schools and government operating of
those schools and by giving parents more
choice over where their children are educat-
ed. Reformers recognized that many children
enter kindergarten already at risk of future
educational problems and pushed for wider
preschool access to increase school readiness.
CED has urged such reforms in earlier
reports1 and continues to support the “steady
work”2 required to improve the massive enter-
prise of public education along many dimen-
sions. In this report, we concentrate on the
need to link the way schools are funded and
managed to the education reform agenda. 
WHY TRADITIONAL 
“SCHOOL FINANCE” NEEDS 
TO CHANGE
By “school finance” we refer to the array of
policies and practices involved in raising, allo-
cating, and spending public money for ele-
mentary and secondary education.
The idea that school finance is of more
than local concern is a comparatively recent
development. America’s public schools
emerged in the 19th century from local 
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private efforts to provide education and were 
initially locally funded and controlled. While
the responsibility to provide education was
explicitly added to state constitutions in the
19th century, states for the most part delegat-
ed this responsibility to local districts. As late
as 1930, localities still provided over 80 per-
cent of all revenues for elementary and sec-
ondary education, relying mostly on property
taxes. Today the state and local shares are
roughly equal. (An overview of school finance
arrangements can be found in the Appendix.)
While states have picked up a larger share of
education costs, however, they have left many
other aspects of school finance unchanged,
leaving the system unsatisfactory in several
ways.
A Focus on Inputs, Not Outcomes
Local funding for schools produced great
disparities among districts, resulting from dif-
ferences in local wealth. The history of school
finance in the 20th century was largely a histo-
ry of state efforts to reduce these disparities.
Finance policy focused on determining dollar
inputs and creating distribution formulas, not
enhancing educational outcomes. 
Funding decisions, therefore, were tradi-
tionally made with little attention to cost-effec-
tiveness and the efficient use of resources.
Financial accounting and reporting systems
still mostly focus on districts, not schools,
obscuring the link between the resources
being spent on specific children and those
children’s learning and hindering efforts to
determine where and how resources might be
better spent. Principals not only lack data on
their schools’ resources but are seldom given
significant control over their budgets, even
though they are increasingly being held
accountable for the performance of their stu-
dents. These managers’ ability to reallocate
resources to what they believe are more effec-
tive uses continues to be severely restricted by
allocation decisions made at the district, state,
and even federal level.
Teacher Pay Misaligned 
with Labor Markets
Just as funding policies were largely
divorced from consideration of educational
outcomes and effective resource allocation,
teacher compensation became increasingly
divorced from labor market realities.
Beginning early in the 20th century, states
and/or districts adopted a so-called “single-
salary schedule” to determine teacher pay. To
end unfair salary policies (for example, pay-
ing women less than men or nepotism or
favoritism), teachers are now paid only on the
basis of their years of experience and the edu-
cational credentials and credits they have
accumulated.
While the single-salary schedule ameliorat-
ed widespread abuses, it also left administra-
tors with little ability to adapt to changing
labor market conditions late in the 20th cen-
tury. Widening employment opportunities
ended schools’ ability to rely on a captive
labor force of women and minorities. At cen-
tury’s end, rising enrollments and the
impending retirement of many teachers hired
30 to 40 years earlier to instruct the “baby
boom” generation left many school districts
facing increasing difficulties hiring the
instructors they needed, particularly in high-
demand fields. Rigid compensation policies
continue to deny administrators the ability to
use pay differentials to encourage teachers to
teach in schools with hard-to-serve students,
despite growing public concern over the edu-
cational disadvantages suffered by such stu-
dents. Pay and pension policies were built on
an assumption that teachers would spend
their career in one place; they thus penalize
mobile workers and hinder districts seeking to
recruit teachers from areas with surpluses.
The Absence of Performance Incentives
Traditional school finance policies, by
ignoring educational outcomes, provide no
incentives for educators to improve their per-
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2
formance. Teachers are paid and districts and
schools receive their formula-determined
share of state aid whether or not their stu-
dents learn. 
The twenty-year old campaign for stan-
dards-based reform and expanded public
school choice options (like charter schools)
has created some new incentives for schools to
care about outcomes. States now report pub-
licly on outcome measures such as test scores
and promotion/graduation rates; some for-
mally grade schools and apply rewards and/or
sanctions to those who perform well or badly.
In a few cases, these rewards include financial
incentives (mostly based on group perform-
ance) that reward educators for improved stu-
dent learning. New federal legislation (the
“No Child Left Behind” Act of 2002) will force
all states to identify low-performing schools
based on state-set standards and to apply an
increasingly extensive set of remedies to those
receiving federal funds that fail to improve.
The growth of charter schools has put pres-
sure on traditional public schools to raise per-
formance in order to keep their students. All
of these developments are pushing schools to
be more focused on outcomes than they used
to be.
But finance policies do not go as far as
they should to provide incentives for
improved performance. Teacher compensa-
tion still reflects credentials and years of serv-
ice rather than effectiveness in the classroom.
Even where established, financial incentive
programs are often cut back after a few years
due to state budget problems, creating skepti-
cism among educators about whether incen-
tives are anything more than empty promises. 
School finance policies continue to target
school districts as the locus of school manage-
ment; and most districts continue to favor
funding only for traditional public schools,
despite widespread dissatisfaction over the
performance of the existing school “monop-
oly.” In hopes of spurring innovation by free-
ing educators from many of the rules and reg-
ulations constraining public schools, reform-
ers have called for new ways of providing pub-
licly-funded education, most notably via char-
ter schools. From the first 2 charter schools
established in Minnesota in 1992, the charter
school universe has grown to nearly 2700 in
school year 2002-03.
Despite the growth of charter schools, how-
ever, few states have created a genuinely level
playing field in financing new kinds of
providers. School finance policies still favor a
single dominant model for supplying public
education and therefore either preclude or
handicap reformers who seek to improve edu-
cational performance through nontraditional
delivery mechanisms.
Funding and the Costs 
of Meeting Standards
Finally, per-pupil spending until recently
was seldom compared to the costs of meeting
educational standards. School budgets result-
ed from political bargaining over how much
revenue would be available from tax receipts
and how much would be devoted to educa-
tion. Sometimes this left districts woefully
short of funds to provide basic educational
services. Outmoded state tax systems and their
ability to keep up with demands for state serv-
ices threatened to put added pressure on state
funding for schools at century’s end, even
before the economic recession that began in
2001 threw states into their worst fiscal crises
since World War II.
INCREASING THE RETURN ON
INVESTMENTS IN LEARNING
Changes to align school finance policies
with wider education reforms are beginning
to occur, but in a slow and piecemeal fashion.
More rapid progress must be made if the
nation’s school finance policies are to con-
tribute to improving student achievement. 
Introduction and Summary
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CED Trustees recommend the following
changes in school funding policies and prac-
tices to improve the performance of the
nation’s public schools.
Allocate Resources More Effectively
within Districts and Schools
Getting the most out of the nation’s huge
investment in education requires using avail-
able resources more effectively and efficiently.
This demands (1) a new view of who should
make spending decisions in the nation’s
15,000 school districts and 90,000-plus
schools, (2) budget processes that better
reflect the differing educational needs of stu-
dents, (3) more attention to the costs of edu-
cational choices, and (4) information systems
capable of providing the data needed for
good decision-making. 
Authority over spending decisions should
be devolved to the school level, in keeping
with both good managerial practice and
school-based accountability for student learn-
ing. Decentralized organizations have consis-
tently been found to outperform centralized
ones. Meaningful decentralization requires
giving school principals actual control over
their financial resources, so they can manage
their resources according to their instruction-
al priorities. Beyond the productivity benefits,
decentralization will give principals the
authority consistent with the accountability
they now have under state laws and “No Child
Left Behind.” 
The path to financial decentralization will
take time to prepare. Most current principals
have little or no background or training in
the skills they will need to handle the new
responsibilities that come with being the
instructional and financial leaders of their
schools. District personnel unaccustomed to
decentralized management and accounting
will also need to be trained for new ways of
carrying out their duties and will need to
develop procedures to account for school-
level spending.
Districts should adopt a new approach to
calculating school budgets that is based on
individual students and their educational
needs. Traditionally, school “budgets” are
determined by allocating staff positions, not
dollars. Staff positions are costed out at dis-
trict salary averages. Since experienced, high-
er-salaried teachers typically exercise their sen-
iority rights to move from low-performing
schools with many high-need students to less-
challenging assignments, schools with large
numbers of educationally at-risk children have
lower-salaried teachers but the same staff
“budgets.” These budgets thus result in the
most needy students receiving less than their
fair share of district resources. Student-based
budgets that allocate funds to schools based
on their student counts, weighted to take into
account the special educational needs of some
students (e.g., poor, disabled, gifted, vocation-
al, English-language learners), can reduce or
eliminate these inequities. 
Cost-effectiveness must be a central 
criterion in resource allocation decisions.
Education researchers and policy makers
need to explicitly consider costs as well as
expected outcomes when deciding among
alternative resource uses. Given the impact of
some education decisions, such as the one to
reduce class size in all early elementary class-
rooms in California, the failure to carefully
consider costs (both financial and nonfinan-
cial) can lead to serious inefficiencies and
unintended consequences.
Strong information systems must be devel-
oped and used to support planning, monitor-
ing, and evaluation of resource use. Too many
districts lack the data needed for responsible
finance management. This has sometimes led
to serious fiscal crises and loss of public confi-
dence. In other districts, good data systems
are undermined by organizational cultures
that ignore fiscal discipline. Districts need to
develop information on resource use at the
school and classroom, not just the district,
level so that spending and outcomes can be
INVESTING IN LEARNING 
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linked. Districts also need examine whether
their spending choices support their learning
goals.
Align Teacher Compensation 
with Labor Market Realities
Teachers are the most important invest-
ment schools make in terms of both money
and student learning. Education leaders must
be given the ability to manage this crucial
resource to address shortages and priority
areas for improvement.
The single-salary schedule should be
replaced with a more flexible compensation
system that allows administrators to align pay
with the realities of the teacher labor market.
The much-heralded “teacher shortage” is not
a generalized problem but one that dispro-
portionately affects certain fields and schools.
Right now, the most disadvantaged students
have teachers with the fewest formal and
informal qualifications. Administrators need
the option of offering differential pay to
attract teachers in high demand fields (e.g.,
math, science) and to provide incentives for
better-qualified teachers to work in low-per-
forming schools.
Because single-salary schedules have so
thoroughly dominated teacher compensation,
there is little research-based evidence on how
different approaches to teacher pay might
affect teacher quality, student outcomes, or
teacher sorting among schools and districts.
But there can be little doubt about the direc-
tion in which compensation should move. All
districts must begin to implement reforms
such as pay differentials to attract strong can-
didates to teaching and to the schools and
subjects where they are most needed.
Administrators will need to work with teachers
and their unions to design and implement
compensation policies that are market-driven
and effectively targeted, since experience
shows clearly that unilateral efforts to impose
new pay plans on teachers are doomed to fail.
Policy makers also need to address trans-
fer and pension policies that penalize mobile
teachers, further handicapping districts facing
difficulties attracting job candidates.
Experienced teachers are generally given only
limited credit on the single-salary schedule if
they move to a new district. Defined-benefit
pension plans, which base benefits on years of
service and pay in the last few years of work,
typically result in mobile teachers receiving
lower pensions than if they taught for a full
career in the same district or state.
Create Incentives for 
Improved Performance 
School finance policies must incorporate
performance incentives. Incentives have an
important role to play in complementing fed-
eral and state accountability requirements.
The most obvious “missing” incentive in
education is the disconnect between teacher
pay and teacher performance. Some portion
of teacher pay should be linked to teachers’
success in improving outcomes for students.
Teachers (and other educators), like other
professionals, should be evaluated by how well
they perform on the job, and some part of
their pay should reflect this performance.
Good teachers should be rewarded financially;
ineffective teachers who are unable to
improve should not only see poor perform-
ance reflected in their pay but ultimately
should be removed from the classroom.
Three approaches show promise for link-
ing pay and performance: group awards for
school-level outcomes, knowledge-and-skills-
based pay, and a linkage between pay and
individual performance. Used in concert, all
three approaches can bring desirable incen-
tives into teacher compensation systems while
minimizing the shortcomings of any one
approach used alone.
Experience in both education and the pri-
vate sector indicates that pay for performance
must be approached with honest acknowledg-
ment of the real challenges in implementing
it. There is still much to learn about how to
Introduction and Summary
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structure such plans so that teachers accept
them and students benefit from them.
Advocates of wider use of pay-for-performance
plans must be prepared to support the costs
necessary to implement and sustain them;
pay-for-performance should encourage teach-
ers to become more productive, but it will not
save money. In fact, it is almost certain to
require additional spending.
These challenges are worth addressing,
because knowing that effort and effectiveness
will be rewarded will encourage strong candi-
dates to enter teaching and effective teachers
to remain in the classroom. We advocate con-
tinued experimentation with pay-for-perform-
ance plans that take into account teaching’s
special circumstances and the importance of
encouraging joint as well as individual efforts
on behalf of students.
A second approach to creating perform-
ance incentives requires more equitable finan-
cial treatment of public schools that utilize
innovative school governance and manage-
ment arrangements. New kinds of schools,
such as charter schools, represent a break
with the historic practice of directing public
education funds only to traditional district-run
schools.
CED Trustees support charter schools not
only because they provide choices for parents
but because of our long-standing concern that
the overly-restrictive regulatory environment
in which traditional schools are governed and
managed stifles needed reforms. We believe
that more equitable financial policies are
needed to give charter schools a fair opportu-
nity to succeed. These schools face a number
of hurdles relating to operating expenses,
start-up costs, and (most significantly) facili-
ties costs that policy makers need to address.
At the same time, charter schools must be
held accountable for their use of public
monies; and state legislatures should ensure
that charter authorizers (school districts, uni-
versities, state boards of education, and oth-
ers) have the financial and nonfinancial
resources they need to carry out the impor-
tant oversight responsibilities assigned by state
law.
Fair funding policies for charter schools
may be especially important for urban districts
facing the most intractable education
improvement challenges. Reformers impatient
with the failure of traditional strategies to
reverse decline and restore public confidence
are in some cities now looking to networks of
charter schools as the best hope for leveraging
change. We will never know if charters can ful-
fill this promise unless we give them a chance
to compete on a level playing field.
Link School Funding to the Costs of
Meeting Education Standards
Even if our previous recommendations are
enacted, state policy makers will still face the
thorny question of whether the financial
resources available to districts and schools are
adequate to accomplish the objectives set for
them. Now that standards-based education
goals and accountability have been adopted by
both state and federal governments, policy
makers have a responsibility to provide suffi-
cient funding for schools and students to
meet the new requirements. This imperative
intersects in some states with court mandates,
where judges are using state constitution
“education clauses” to require that public offi-
cials provide all students with an “adequate”
education.
Linking funding levels to educational
objectives is more easily said than done, how-
ever. It requires policy makers to address two
tough challenges: how to determine what the
public’s education goals should cost and how
to raise the revenues necessary to fund those
costs. Thanks in part to the need to meet
court requirements, analysts have developed
several methods for linking costs and stan-
dards. These methods, while still crude, never-
theless represent an advance over previous
budget-setting practices by giving policy mak-
ers tools for bringing explicit consideration of
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the relationship between expectations and
costs into budget debates. Finding ways to
address the problem of outmoded tax struc-
tures that do not keep pace with public
demands for services and that lead to harmful
“boom and bust” cycles of program expansion
and contraction will also be important in
ensuring that states have the capacity to
implement their educational goals.
PROMOTING SCHOOL 
FINANCE REFORM
School finance reform is politically diffi-
cult. It often shakes up the status quo and
threatens the vested interests of individuals
and groups who benefit from existing
arrangements. It may require more spending,
at least in some places. Reforming education
finance, like reforming education more gener-
ally, will require steady, focused pursuit of a
coherent agenda over time to make a differ-
ence. Policy makers willing to make the need-
ed changes need support from business lead-
ers and others, not only in helping design
effective policies but in maintaining the politi-
cal backing necessary to defeat those who
would return to business as usual. We call on
our counterparts across America to work for
the agenda laid out in this report and urge
policy makers to adopt strategies that make
good use of the nation’s educational invest-
ments to help America’s children achieve high
learning standards.
Introduction and Summary
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In school year 2001-02, national spending
on K-12 education amounted to approximately
$400 billion, or an average of $8,048 per stu-
dent. This represents a large increase over
spending levels of 40 years ago. Inflation has
of course eaten away at some of the apparent
increase, though how much is uncertain given
serious disputes over the proper way to make
inflation adjustments in education.† Further-
more, schools have unquestionably taken on
expensive new responsibilities (for example, to
educate children with disabilities). Neverthe-
less, the financial resources available to schools
are sizeable. (See Figure 1.) Whether they are
sizeable enough to handle all that schools are
8
Chapter 2 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES 
EFFECTIVELY
† Researchers disagree over the appropriate measures to use in
adjusting education spending over time for inflation. The
Consumer Price Index, used in the table here, reflects changes
in prices of a market basket of goods typically consumed by
households. Goods consumed by schools are quite different
(e.g., the most frequently-consumed “good” is teachers). Using
cost indices specifically designed to take account of the educa-
tion sector’s particular market basket of goods raises other ques-
tions, however (e.g., how to account for changes in teacher qual-
ity and in the labor market for teachers). While adjusting educa-
tion spending by the CPI probably overstates the real growth in
education spending, the resources available now to provide edu-
cational services are clearly higher than they were 40 years ago.
Figure 1
U.S. Public School Resources, 1960-2002 U.S. Public School Resources, 1960-2002
Current Expendituresa per Pupil (ADA)b, Current Expenditures per Pupil (ADA),
Unadjusted Dollars 2001/2002 Dollarsc
a. Current expenditures do not include capital outlay and interest on school debt. 
b. Average Daily Attendance (ADA) is determined by dividing the aggregate attendance of a school during a reporting period (normally 
a school year) by the number of days school is in session during this period.
c. Based on the Consumer Price Index, prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, adjusted to a school- year basis.
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2002 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Education, June 2003), Table 166, p. 194.
NOTE: 2002 values are estimated
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currently being asked to do is a question we
will take up in Chapter 5.
But are existing resources being used effi-
ciently and effectively? We have identified a
number of strategies to help educators and
policy makers choose investments that will pay
off in improved learning. There are no uni-
versally-applicable answers to how districts and
schools should use their resources, but allow-
ing school-level educators to control their
budgets and making resource allocation
processes and decisions more transparent are
important steps in making effective decisions.
In this chapter, we propose ways of making
better resource allocation decisions: devolving
spending to principals via student-based budg-
ets; considering cost-effectiveness as well as
educational benefits when selecting among
alternative policies; and developing data to
plan, monitor, and evaluate educational
spending. In the next chapter, we will focus
specifically on education’s most costly
resource: teachers.
DECENTRALIZING SPENDING
AUTHORITY VIA STUDENT-BASED
BUDGETS
Effective resource allocation depends on
who has the authority to make spending deci-
sions and the incentives they face. Business
practitioners favor decentralizing decision
authority and accountability; decentralized
organizations have consistently been found to
perform at higher levels than centralized
ones.3 School districts, however, mostly still
operate through top-down, centralized man-
agement. While principals and other school-
level educators are now being held account-
able for improving the performance of their
students, these individuals generally have little
or no control over how their school’s
resources are spent. Their accountability is
undermined when authority over spending
decisions lies elsewhere.
Making Decentralization Real 
Many school districts claim to have decen-
tralized through some form of site-based man-
agement or local school council, but these
reforms have largely failed to improve student
performance. In fact, these reforms have
mostly involved what William Ouchi has called
“phony decentralization.” Most crucially, they
did not give school personnel meaningful
control over their financial resources.4
Moreover, many earlier site-based manage-
ment reforms lacked clear performance
incentives toward agreed-upon goals.5 Today
standards-based education and accountability
supply the previously-missing enabling condi-
tions under which real decentralization can
lead to improved school performance.
Only a handful of districts have currently
devolved spending authority to schools to any
great degree. We urge school boards and
superintendents to follow the example of and
learn from districts such as Cincinnati,
Houston, Milwaukee, Sacramento, and Seattle
in giving schools control over their budgets.†
Giving schools control over the bulk of
their budgets does not mean replacing district
influence over instructional programs. Every
school “doing its own thing” can be disastrous
in large urban districts where large numbers
of students frequently change schools and
where academic performance levels are per-
sistently low. Houston coupled meaningful
resource decentralization with a project that
aligned curriculum in four basic subjects with
state standards and assessments. The district
also replaced five different reading programs
with a unified reading approach aligned with
standards, in recognition of high student
mobility and wide variation in teacher skills
and experience. Subsequently, the district
adopted a single reading program for grades
Allocating Resources Effectively
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† American experience with meaningful decentralized spending
authority is fairly recent. Therefore, many American districts
have looked for valuable guidance to Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada, which began its transformation in 1973 to a decentral-
ized district with (now) over 90 percent of school budgets
under their principals’ control.
1-3, but exempted high-performing schools
and schools that received permission to use
other programs. Sacramento, too, combined
decentralized spending authority with district-
wide curriculum reforms aimed at bringing
more coherence to the instructional
program.6
Spending authority cannot be devolved to
schools overnight. As will be discussed later,
new budgeting and financial tracking systems
have to be developed. A host of operational
details must be decided (for example, how to
adjust funding levels when enrollments
change during the year, or how to budget for
central office services). District and school
personnel must be trained to use the new sys-
tems. Principals and teacher leaders also need
to learn how to link their new control over
spending decisions to their instructional pri-
orities.7 Principals need to develop new kinds
of leadership skills for their new roles as
instructional and financial leaders of their
schools. (See text box, “Business Helps
Principals Develop Leadership Skills.”) Each
district will have to decide whether schools
will be required to continue using some cen-
tral services, or whether they will be given dol-
lars instead and allowed to choose between
purchasing services (such as maintenance or
professional development for teachers) from
the district or contracting from a private
provider. 
“Student-Based” Budgets
Effective and equitable implementation of
decentralized spending authority requires a
new approach to calculating school budgets,
replacing “staff-based” with “student-based”
formulas. Most districts allocate resources to
schools based on an allowed number of staff
positions, not dollars. In contrast, student-
based budgets calculate school allotments on
the basis of the number of students enrolled.
We urge that decentralized spending authority
be coupled with student-based budgets, to
give individual schools the flexibility to allo-
cate resources in accordance with their
instructional priorities, as well as to reduce or
eliminate inequities in staff-based budget for-
mulas that have gone largely unrecognized
until recently.
Published district budgets for individual
schools (if they are available) differ signifi-
cantly from the resource allocation patterns
found when researchers build real-dollar
budgets from the ground up, using actual
salary and benefit rates (rather than averages)
for the staff members assigned to particular
schools. Districts that believe they are spend-
ing equitably from school to school find out
that the reality is quite otherwise. There are
significant differences in funding among
schools in the same district, and the schools 
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Principals taking on new levels of responsibility for managing their schools can benefit from the
experience and expertise of business leaders. This is the premise behind the Partnership to Advance
School Success (PASS) program in Florida. PASS pairs senior corporate executives with individual
school principals; a professional educator who serves as an instructional coach is also part of the
team. The CEOs mentor the principal for three years, using their knowledge of how to run efficient,
focused organizations to help improve public education. One program administrator says, “We are
trying to get a new mindset for the principals. They are CEOs. They are running large organizations.
They need to be empowered to make decisions.” Currently principals in 29 schools are participating
in the PASS program.
SOURCE: Nancy Dunne, “An Experiment in Empowering Education,” Financial Times, October 17, 2003. Information on PASS
available online at www.educationchange.com/PASS/about.htm
BUSINESS HELPS PRINCIPALS DEVELOP LEADERSHIP SKILLS
hurt most are often those most in need of
resources.8
Districts typically allocate resources to
schools mainly through formulas that allot
each school a certain number of staff posi-
tions based partially on enrollment and par-
tially on other factors. These formulas are rel-
atively insensitive to differences in educational
needs among the students enrolled at differ-
ent schools. They also lead to rigidities (such
as difficulties in “trading off” staff positions
for other uses) that interfere with schools’
ability to implement reforms that call for dif-
ferent patterns of expenditures than those
authorized by the staff-based budget. In addi-
tion to their formula allocations, schools
receive services from the central office, but
most districts do not track how central-office
budgets affect individual schools. Between 40
to 60 percent of districts’ general funds are
used for these central services and do not
appear in school budgets.9
Student-based budgeting,† by contrast, allo-
cates dollars to schools based on the number
of students enrolled, weighted to take into
account the special educational needs of vari-
ous categories of students (e.g., poor, dis-
abled, gifted, vocational, or English-language
learners). Such budgets have a number of
advantages. By increasing intradistrict equity,
they remove excuses for poor performance on
the part of once-underfunded schools. They
help illuminate the relationship between
spending and student achievement by linking
resources as closely as possible to the individ-
ual student. By making allocations for individ-
ual students transparent, they help leaders
allocate resources to meet identified needs
and goals. They encourage schools to keep
students, including those they might other-
wise shun. At the same time, they make it easi-
er to implement public school choice pro-
grams, such as magnets and charter schools.
Cincinnati and Houston are among a
handful of districts that are in the early stages
of implementing student-based budgeting.
Each district has discovered that interschool
funding levels differed dramatically under tra-
ditional approaches. In Cincinnati, there was
a per pupil disparity of more than $6,000
between its least-funded school and its high-
est-funded school (less than $4,000 versus
more than $10,000 per pupil). Lesser but still
substantial disparities existed district-wide.
Houston discovered similar patterns, though
with less variance. When these districts began
moving from their traditional staff-based for-
mulas to new student-based budgets, they saw
significant increases in interschool equity.10
Figure 2 shows that, as student-based budgets
were introduced, actual school budgets in
each city began to cluster more tightly around
the hypothetical funding each school would
receive if it were given the district’s average
allocation of money for each category of stu-
dent at the school (i.e., the school’s weighted
average expenditure). 
Accounting for Teacher Salaries
Disparities among schools within districts
would appear even more dramatic if the
effects of another traditional practice—using
average rather than actual salaries in school
budget calculations—were more widely recog-
nized. Districts typically cost-out each position
in a school at the average salary level for that
position in the district. This is true even in
districts such as Cincinnati and Houston that
have moved to student-based budgeting.
Using average salaries instead of actual
salaries grossly distorts the resources being
spent in each school because, as we shall see
in Chapter 3, teachers with different levels of
seniority and salary do not distribute them-
selves evenly across schools, even within the
same district. Schools with more minority and
poorer children typically have only a few
applicants for each open position and gener-
ally end up with the least experienced teach-
ers in the district. More advantaged schools
often have many more applicants (including
teachers using their seniority rights to transfer
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† Also sometimes called “weighted student funding.”
out of less attractive schools) and thus have
more room to select the teachers they think
will be the most effective. Schools with the
most applicants choose more expensive senior
teachers, as indicated by the higher average
salary levels found in these schools.11
High-poverty, low-performing schools get
hurt by the practice of averaging salaries
because they employ disproportionately more
inexperienced and inexpensive teachers and
are not allowed to keep the difference to
spend for other uses (e.g., lower class sizes)
that might help them compensate for their
handicaps in recruiting. Marguerite Roza and
Paul Hill12 studied actual teacher salary costs
in four districts: Baltimore City Schools,
Baltimore County, Cincinnati Public Schools,
and Seattle Public Schools. Average teacher
salaries at the school level differed widely
from district averages. (See Figure 3.) For
example, in Baltimore City, with a district-wide
average salary of $47,178, one elementary
school had an average salary of $37,618.
Similar results were found in the other three
districts. In each district, high-poverty, low-
performing schools routinely were staffed
with teachers earning below-average salaries. 
We urge education and community leaders
to end inequities and inefficiencies in the cur-
rent approaches to school-level funding by
using actual rather than average salaries in
their calculations. We acknowledge that there
are many challenges that must be addressed
in making this change. Perhaps the biggest is
political: there will be winners and losers,
especially in an era of economic stringency;
and it will take strong voices in favor of
improved budgeting to counter the forces of
self-interest. We note that the Houston school
board, the only one that had made a commit-
ment to moving to the use of actual rather
than average salaries over a five-year period,
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Figure 2
Increases in Funding Equity with Student-Based Budgeting
Percent of schools with actual budget allocations within 
5% of what the school 10% of what the school
would have received would have received
using weighted average using weighted average
expenditurea expenditurea
Last year using a 
staff-based formula 49% 77%
Houston First year implementing 
a student-based formula 72% 82%
Last year using a staff-
based formula 23% 42%
Cincinnati First year implementing
a student-based formula 23% 49%
Fourth year implementing 
a student-based formula 87% 97%
a. The weighted average expenditure is what the district would allocate to a school if the school received the district’s average 
allocation for each category of student at that school. The weighted average expenditure for each school is calculated by, first, multi-
plying the total number of students in the school by the district’s basic per pupil allocation. Second, the district’s average additional
expenditure per pupil in a weighted category (e.g., bilingual students) is multiplied by the number of students in that category at
the school. The result is added to the first quantity. This second step is repeated for each weighted category to be analyzed.
SOURCE: Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University: School Communities that Work Task Force, 
First Steps to a Level Playing Field: An Introduction to Student-Based Budgeting (June 2002), available at 
<http//www.schoolcommunities.org/images/SBB.pdf> Accessed July 9, 2003.
reversed itself in the spring of 2003 and
tabled the controversial policy for fear of
angering parents, prompting “white flight,”
and (in the view of opponents) contributing
to achievement declines in better schools.13
How State and Federal 
Policy Makers Can Help
We urge state and federal policy makers to
review and modify their policies that con-
tribute to budget inflexibility and inequity
within districts.
States often have instructional and/or col-
lective bargaining rules that restrict schools’
ability to shift resources and rearrange the use
of teacher time. State and federal categorical
programs (which together number over 100
in a state like California) further limit school
discretion. State collective bargaining laws
that permit teachers to select their schools
based on seniority also contribute to the
inequitable allocation of teachers across
schools. Some states pay districts on a weight-
ed per-teacher basis, paying more for senior
teachers than junior ones, but not requiring
districts to distribute the state money equi-
tably among students. 
Title 1 of the federal Elementary and
Secondary Education Act† (designed to pro-
vide additional resources for schools enrolling
disadvantaged students) has since the early
1980s permitted districts to average teacher
salaries when meeting the federal require-
ment that district funds be distributed equi-
tably before federal funds are allocated. As a
result, as long as inequities in district funding
policies are driven by teacher allocations they
are not in violation of the federal law.14
We urge the federal government, when it
next reauthorizes Title 1, to require districts
to calculate spending using actual, not aver-
age, teacher salaries. Such a provision was
supported by a bipartisan coalition during the
last reauthorization but was not included in
the final act. 
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Baltimore City Baltimore County Cincinnati Seattle
Average gain or loss in 
school budget if actual 
rather than average (+/-) $101,786 (+/-) $120,612 (+/-) $106,974 (+/-) $72,576
salaries had been used 
to calculate school budget 
Average gain or loss per pupil (+/-) $246 (+/-) $232 (+/-) $189 (+/-) $144
Average percent impact on
each school’s budget 5.9% 6.5% 5.9% 4.9%
Maximum benefit as percent 
of the school’s budget 21.8% 17.7% 15.6% 11.0%
Maximum loss as percent 
of school’s budget -20.8% -18.4% -19.2% -21.8%
SOURCE: Marguerite Roza and Paul T. Hill, “How Within-District Spending Inequities Help Some Schools to Fail” (a draft 
conference paper for the Brookings Conference on The Teachers We Need, May 2003), available at <http://www.crpe.org/working-
papers/pdf/Roza-Hill.pdf> Accessed October 30, 2003.
Figure 3
The Impact of Salary Averaging in Four Districts
† The most recent reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, enacted in 2002, was given
the name “No Child Left Behind.”
CONSIDERING 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
A key aspect of effective resource use that
is often ignored in education is cost-effective-
ness.† Too often decisions about such things as
class size or teacher deployment or curricu-
lum purchases, if they involve analysis at all,
take into consideration only the expected
effects on outcomes and not the expenditures
required for each increment of improvement.
Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to determine
which of two or more programs will achieve
either the most improvement for a given
expenditure or the lowest cost for a given
level of improvement.15
We urge researchers to incorporate cost
considerations in their studies, and we encour-
age educators to examine costs as well as ben-
efits when deciding which programs to adopt
or keep. Studies have shown that education
policy research does not commonly use cost
analysis as one of its tools; such analysis is less
likely to be found in education research than
in evaluations in other policy fields such as
health care.16 But even less formal assessments
of costs relative to expected student learning
outcomes would be better than the current
situation where program costs are often
ignored altogether or not evaluated against
the costs and expected learning outcomes of
alternative policy choices. 
The consequences of failing to consider
cost-effectiveness when making resource allo-
cation decisions can be seen in recent experi-
ences with class-size reduction programs.
Reducing class size is a popular step with par-
ents and teachers, and its appeal to policy
makers has been enhanced because its effec-
tiveness in improving student learning
appears to be supported by research. Benefits
from smaller classes were found in one of the
few large-scale random-assignment experi-
ments ever conducted in K-12 education, the
Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement
Ratio (or STAR) study. (See text box, “Project
STAR.”) Many states and districts have jumped
on the small-class-size bandwagon, most
notably California, whose elementary schools
in the mid-1990s had the largest class size in
the country (averaging 29 students). In 1996 a
Republican governor and a Democratic legis-
lature joined in support of a state-wide initia-
tive providing districts with $650 per student
for each kindergarten through third grade
classroom with 20 or fewer students.††
Reducing class sizes is a very expensive pol-
icy option. California’s class size reduction
program cost the state approximately $1 bil-
lion in the first year and rose to $1.6 billion
annually within a few years. At the time of its
adoption, no consideration was given to what
alternative uses this large expenditure might
be put. Some analysts suggest that variations
in teacher quality are much more significant
than class size variations in improving student
achievement,17 raising the question of whether
investments in improving teacher quality
would yield greater returns than class size
reduction. Similarly, the presence of disrup-
tive students in a classroom negatively affects
their own and their peers’ learning. It might
be possible to find ways of bringing discipline
and attentiveness to classrooms that would
result in the same learning benefits as more
expensive class size reduction programs.18
California’s experience with class size
reduction also illustrates why it is important to
consider costs that are not strictly financial
when weighing the desirability of a policy
change. Class size reduction was associated
with declines in teacher qualifications and a
more inequitable distribution of credentialed
teachers because of the large number of new
teachers required to staff the smaller classes.
INVESTING IN LEARNING 
14
† Cost-effectiveness is used here instead of cost-benefit because
cost-benefit analysis usually expresses both inputs and outcomes
in dollar terms, and the latter is seldom possible in education.
Cost-effectiveness analysis allows outcomes to be expressed in
such forms as achievement test scores or graduation rates.
†† Districts received the $650 if they first reduced all first grade
classes in a school, followed by all second grades and finally by
either kindergarten or third grade classes.
The proportion of K-3 teachers without full
credentials rose from 1.8 percent before the
program started to 12.5 percent in the second
year of the program. Disadvantaged students
suffered most from the growth in uncreden-
tialed teachers, because their schools were
slower to implement class size reduction and
more qualified teachers had already been
hired elsewhere. Since operating costs for
class size reduction generally exceeded state
payments for it, districts also took money from
other programs such as professional develop-
ment, computer programs, and libraries and
reduced funds for facility maintenance and
administrative services.19 These tradeoffs were
not necessarily unwise from the standpoint of
improving student achievement. The point is
that the decision about class size reduction
was taken without weighing its benefits against
the effects on learning of things that would
have to be given up. 
DEVELOPING DATA TO PLAN,
MONITOR, AND EVALUATE 
Every competent organization uses infor-
mation as feedback to improve its production
processes. Educators have lagged in using
data to improve instructional processes, in no
small measure because relevant and timely
data were often absent, but also few incentives
existed to use data to improve student learn-
ing. 
The accountability movement in education
and new requirements in the “No Child Left
Behind” Act relating to school performance,
teacher quality, and research-based education
strategies are pushing education toward build-
ing better information systems. Improving the
data infrastructure, though, involves “unsexy”
and comparatively invisible investments that
are easy to neglect in tough budget times. We
urge education leaders to develop the sound
information systems required for effective
resource allocation and to foster an organiza-
tional culture that makes good use of the
information such systems provide.
Tracking money for schools is not an easy
task. As the Appendix shows, education dol-
lars come from many sources (federal, state,
and local governments, as well as nongovern-
mental sources), each with separate record-
keeping requirements and accounting rules.
Districts, therefore, maintain multiple
accounting systems and often keep informa-
tion on separate computer systems that can-
not communicate with one another. Similarly
fragmented approaches characterize expendi-
ture systems. Thus district personnel often
cannot find out basic things about their
spending, such as what particular central
office services cost.20
The immediate financial consequences, to
say nothing of the consequences for student
learning, can be high when information sys-
tems are inadequate. Antiquated information
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Project STAR was a $12 million research project conducted in and funded by the state of
Tennessee. It began in 1985. It explored the question of whether small class size in the early grades
could improve student achievement. Students in selected schools were randomly assigned to either a
small class (13-17 students), a regular class (22-26 students), or a regular class with a full-time aide as
well as a teacher. After 4 years (kindergarten through third grade), all children in the study were
returned to a regular size classroom.  Academic achievement was tracked for students while they
were in the study and for several years after they returned to regular classrooms. 
Many analyses have been conducted of the STAR data, and not all researchers agree on all the
results. In general, though, STAR suggested that there were achievement benefits for students in
small classes and that the benefits were larger for minority students than for others. There were no
benefits for students in regular classes with aides compared to regular classes without aides. 
PROJECT STAR
technology used for financial tracking is
blamed by many district leaders for a rash of
budget errors that have found both large and
small districts suddenly dealing with big budg-
et shortfalls. Systems for tracking employees
have broken down in a number of places,
leaving district leaders with inaccurate infor-
mation on the number of positions on the
payroll. Districts may track money and people
with different systems that are not well-
linked.21 Failures in systems that track the
number of students enrolled can cost districts
big money, since many state subsidies are
awarded on a student headcount basis.
Budget management problems that might
have caused only minor headaches in more
robust economic times turn quickly into crises
when revenues are simultaneously falling
short of expectations. Thus Oakland,
California, for example, found itself over $80
million in debt in 2003, costing the school
superintendent his job in June and causing
the state to impose a state-appointed adminis-
trator as the price of a $100 million emer-
gency state loan. Seattle’s superintendent in
April 2003 announced plans to resign, facing
criticism over fiscal mismanagement because
of a budget shortfall of $23 million in the
2001-2002 school year, with another $12 mil-
lion deficit projected for 2002-2003. 
While outdated and incompatible informa-
tion technology is a real problem in many dis-
tricts, the Seattle situation demonstrates that
even good information systems cannot save a
district from undisciplined financial business
practices. An external audit gave the system
high marks for the quality of its financial and
personnel management software.22 The audit,
however, also presented evidence of manageri-
al failings that led a school-board-appointed
Committee for Fiscal Integrity to conclude:
“Improved financial business practices will not
alone eliminate the risk of financial crises
unless accompanied by a reform of the
District’s organizational culture. The culture
emanating from the Board and Superinten-
dent must reinforce discipline with regard to
fiscal matters. Currently the business culture
supports work-arounds, short-cuts, and 
optimism unfettered by facts.”23
Districts without sound information sys-
tems and a culture that encourages data-
driven decision-making are unlikely to allo-
cate resources effectively to enhance student
achievement. Principals and teachers need
feedback on how resources are related to the
learning being produced within individual
schools and classrooms, in order to know
which financial investments are paying off and
which need to be redirected. Financial report-
ing systems, however, often make it difficult or
impossible to link resource use and student
outcomes. School finance systems generally
report revenue sources and expenditures at
the district level. These reports do not allow
resource use to be linked to instructional pro-
grams and practices at the individual school,
classroom, or student level. Although some
districts have made significant progress in
recent years in developing school-level budg-
ets, we saw earlier that current financial
reports often give quite inaccurate informa-
tion about the actual resources being used at
individual schools. Even accurate and current
data are seldom presented in usable and easily
understood formats that allow policy makers,
educators, parents and others to explore how
program costs and student learning are relat-
ed.
Along with developing better data on
school and classroom use of resources, educa-
tors need to more carefully examine how they
deploy the resources they have available.
Districts willing to drill down into their cur-
rent spending patterns may well find that they
can make far better use of their existing
resources to support important learning goals.
In 1999, for example, the Boston Public
Schools district conducted an unprecedented
analysis of its professional development
(teacher training) budget to find out what was
being spent and how. The district discovered
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that it was spending about 4 percent—a
respectable $23.4 million—on professional
development. It expected to find most of
these funds focused on its key reform strategy:
in-school coaching to improve instruction.
Instead, it learned that only $5 million was
integrated into this effort. The findings
enabled the district to make a number of
changes to reallocate resources and reinforce
activities that support the district’s reform
effort. Based on Boston’s experience, Chicago
decided to launch a similar audit.24
New sources of information designed to
help states, districts, and schools “think
smarter” about their resource allocation deci-
sions are becoming available. We recommend
that policy makers and educators routinely
utilize resources such as the National Center
for Educational Accountability and the What
Works Clearinghouse as part of their planning
and evaluation activities. (See text boxes,
“National Center for Educational
Accountability” and “The What Works
Clearinghouse.”)
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The National Center for Educational Accountability promotes the use of student performance
data to improve schools. The Center, a collaborative effort of Just for the Kids, the University of
Texas, and the Education Commission of the States, uses data as the linchpin of a strategy for school
improvement. The Center has developed methods of linking individual student records over multi-
ple years to permit each school in a state to be “benchmarked” against the highest performing
schools in the state that have comparable student populations. Individual school analyses can be
viewed at www.just4kids.org. The Center also uses these data to investigate instructional strategies
that distinguish high-performing schools and is developing training programs to provide educators,
parents, business leaders, and policy makers with the findings from its work.
In September 2003 the federal government and the Broad Foundation announced they would
fund about half of a planned two-year, $60 million project in which the Center will joint with
Standard and Poor’s School Evaluation Services to provide an Internet warehouse of student achieve-
ment and other data collected under the No Child Left Behind law. The project aims to post every
state’s school-level test-score data along with information about the financial resources available at
each school.
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The WWC was established in 2002 by the U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education
Sciences to improve the quality of education by providing educators and policy makers with the
results of high-quality scientific research on effective programs, practices, and products.  Modeled on
an approach used for some time in medicine, the WWC addresses the need to help decision makers
identify topics on which solid research evidence exists and sort through the completing claims and
conflicting interpretations about research findings that contribute to confusion about what works in
education.
The WWC will develop standards for reviewing and synthesizing educational research and will
provide its findings in free, searchable, and user-friendly databases. Information about the WWC, its
evaluation protocols, and the results of its reviews can be found at www.w-w-c.org
THE WHAT WORKS CLEARINGHOUSE
Effective resource use is nowhere more
important than for education’s major
resource: teachers. As noted earlier, teachers
are schools’ key investment, and effective
teachers contribute substantially to students’
academic achievement. To improve student
learning, therefore, educators need the ability
to manage this crucial resource.
The dominant form of teacher compensa-
tion—the single-salary schedule—fails to
reflect the realities of the teacher labor mar-
ket. It handicaps managers in competing for
talented women and men to teach. This hand-
icap is particularly troublesome for urban dis-
tricts, exacerbating their difficulties in attract-
ing teachers to work in schools with compara-
tively poor working conditions and many
hard-to-teach students. The inflexibility of the
single-salary schedule also severely limits the
pool of teachers available to fill jobs in some
fields of study and some schools.
Attracting and keeping effective teachers is
a challenge that cannot be addressed just by
redesigning compensation. Many other
changes are needed: improved teacher prepa-
ration programs; more widespread use of
alternative routes to teacher certification;
improved information on supply and demand
projections by field; streamlined hiring prac-
tices by schools and districts; better mentoring
for new teachers to reduce costly turnover in
the earliest years of teaching; and improved
working conditions and a supportive manage-
ment climate for all teachers.
Nevertheless, CED believes that the time
has come to modernize how teachers are paid.
Compensation policies must reflect the reali-
ties of the labor market in which schools
recruit and the need to attract teachers to
serve the nation’s neediest students. This
chapter focuses on ways to improve managers’
ability to recruit and retain qualified teachers
for all schools and subjects by changing the
way teachers are paid. The next chapter exam-
ines the question of whether some part of
teacher pay should be tied directly to the
teacher’s measured success in improving stu-
dent learning.
LABOR MARKET CHANGES 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMPENSATION
One challenge facing school administra-
tors seeking to hire and retain teachers is that
they can no longer count on the captive work-
force that existed when women and minorities
had few other employment opportunities. The
impact on education of new labor market
realities was initially blunted because the
“baby bust” of the 1970s and 1980s reduced
the need for new teachers. Worries about
teacher shortages emerged in the 1990s, how-
ever, as enrollments rose, labor markets were
tight, and districts began focusing on the
pending retirement of many teachers who
were hired 30 to 40 years ago to instruct the
“baby boom” generation. While stagnant eco-
nomic conditions in the early years of the new
century and slowing enrollment growth have
relieved the hiring situation somewhat, short-
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ages may again become a pressing concern
when the economy improves and as “baby
boom” teachers reach retirement age.
Is Overall Pay Too Low?
Teacher organizations and others argue
that overall teacher salaries must be increased
if schools are to attract the high quality work-
force education reformers want. Our review
of the evidence leads us to conclude that the
case for overall salary increases is mixed, but
that there are persuasive arguments in favor
of pay increases for some teachers. This
includes teachers in districts whose salaries
are demonstrably uncompetitive, teachers who
are willing to serve in hard-to-staff schools or
who have specialties that are in short supply
(such as math and science), and (as we will
argue in the next chapter) those who perform
well on the job.
The majority of teachers—now 75 per-
cent—have been and continue to be women.
The opening of many traditionally male occu-
pations to women in the latter third of the
20th century gave female prospective teachers
many other employment options. At the same
time, the comparative financial attractiveness
of teaching was diminished by a decline in
teacher earnings relative to nonteachers, 
especially for women, over the period 1940-
1990.25 Similar patterns prevailed for minori-
ties, complicating the task of school districts
seeking to hire more minority teachers to bet-
ter reflect the diversity of student bodies.
Also troublesome for schools are the dra-
matic salary increases enjoyed over the past 40
years by highly educated workers, particularly
those with technical backgrounds in science
and math. These highly skilled individuals
have seen their pay increase both absolutely
and relative to less educated workers, adding
to the pressure on schools seeking to hire
teachers for science and math classes.26
Advocates of higher overall teacher salaries
often cite statistics to show that average
teacher salaries and average starting salaries
are substantially lower than those in other job
categories. These data are difficult to inter-
pret, however. First, the choice of jobs used
for comparison purposes is open to question.
Should teachers be compared to accountants
and computer systems analysts and engineers
and attorneys or to journalists, registered
nurses, FBI agents, and military officers?
Second, teachers work a shorter day and
shorter year than many other workers; typical-
ly teachers are paid for 9- or 10-month school
years and on-site time required by union con-
tracts is sometimes 7 hours or less daily. Third,
the benefits teachers enjoy (especially their
medical and retirement plans) are often bet-
ter than those of many private-sector workers.
Finally, some nonteaching occupations have
many more high earners than does teaching,
thus skewing the averages. Michael Podgursky
found significant pay gaps between teachers
and nonteachers for recent college graduates
with bachelor’s or master’s degrees when
looking at averages: a 32 percent advantage
overall for nonteachers versus teachers.
Median earnings, however, were only 10 per-
cent higher for the nonteaching group, a gap
he argues is readily explained by the shorter
workday and workyear for teachers.27
Moreover, it is difficult to “monetize” the
value teachers place on teaching jobs because
of the flexibility they gain to balance work and
family responsibilities. The hours at school
are short compared to most office hours and
match the hours children are in school; teach-
ers can be home during their children’s sum-
mer vacation; substitute teachers can be
arranged when the regular teacher’s children
are sick; and the job requires little or no out-
of-town travel. By contrast, many of the “new
jobs” that have opened to women in the last
40 years are managerial and professional posi-
tions rather than the clerical positions that
dominated among college-educated women
who weren’t teachers in 1960. The greater
time requirements, responsibility, and stress of
these “new job” arguably offset some of the
comparative salary disadvantage that was men-
tioned earlier.28
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None of this is to say, however, that teacher
pay is in all cases adequate or that salaries do
not matter to schools’ ability to attract and
keep teachers. Over 40 years ago, economists
Joseph Kershaw and Roland McKean noted
that shortages in specific areas, such as math
and science teachers, resulted from uniform
pay practices that failed to recognize the non-
teaching opportunities open to individuals in
certain disciplines.29 Subsequent research has
shown that salaries make a difference in
teachers’ decisions to enter the profession,
move across schools and districts, and leave
teaching altogether.30
In this diverse, decentralized nation of
nearly 15,000 school districts, salaries vary
widely. Some systems undoubtedly need to
raise the general level of teacher pay to com-
pete effectively in their local labor markets.
Oklahoma, for example, raised its teacher
salaries by $3,000 in 2000, after finding it was
losing many teachers to Texas districts where
salaries were higher.31 In a recent New York
court case about whether the state was meet-
ing its constitutional responsibilities for
financing education in New York City, both
plaintiffs and defendants presented evidence
that the city is at a comparative disadvantage
in its labor market for teachers. The city com-
petes mainly with four surrounding suburban
counties for instructors but pays teachers at all
levels of experience substantially less than
teachers earn in those counties, while offering
less attractive working conditions.32
The effect of raising overall pay in most
places, however, is arguable. Increasing
salaries for all teachers would be an expensive
proposition and its effect on teacher quality
unclear. It is a blunt tool, rewarding effective
and ineffective teachers alike. Teacher
turnover, often cited as one indicator that
higher salaries are needed, is actually not very
high after the first few years of teaching.33
Raising starting salaries might improve the
pool of candidates from which new teachers
are drawn; but research suggests that hiring
practices would have to change as well,
because many districts appear to do a poor
job in selecting teachers from that pool.34
Most importantly, across-the-board salary
increases would not address the two clearest
problems in the teacher labor market: the dif-
ficulty of hiring teachers in some fields and
disparities among schools in the characteris-
tics of their faculty.
Teacher Pay and Teacher Shortages
Difficulties in hiring teachers in high-
demand subjects and specialties have been
observed since at least the time of the
Kershaw-McKean study cited earlier (for
recent views, see Figure 4). The Southern
Regional Education Board notes that states
have historically prepared too few graduates
in mathematics, science, and special educa-
tion (the latter field denotes teachers who
work with students with disabilities).35 Math
and science graduates often have attractive
opportunities outside teaching. As a result,
the proportion of mathematics and science
teachers who are not fully certified to teach
those classes is higher than in other subjects,
and there is evidence that teacher quality is
lower. For example, among New York public
school teachers outside of New York City, fail-
ure rates for math, chemistry, and physics
teachers who have taken the New York
Content Specialty Certification Exams in their
subjects areas one or more times were 21 per-
cent, 15 percent, and 32 percent respectively.
By contrast, failure rates on the English and
social science tests were two percent and six
percent respectively. (Failure rates in New
York City showed the same pattern across sub-
jects but were substantially higher.)36
In light of the new national goal to “leave
no child behind,” it is especially disturbing to
find that the most disadvantaged students
have teachers with the fewest formal and
informal qualifications. These students attend
schools that often face much greater difficulty
filling their teaching job openings than other
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schools in the same area. This situation stems
from the reality that teachers prefer to teach
in high-performing schools with lower per-
centages of minority students and children in
poverty, and, under most union contracts, can
exercise these preferences through seniority-
based transfer rights. Uniform salaries within
districts give them no incentive to do other-
wise.
Using an unusually detailed New York State
database on teachers, Susanna Loeb found
that much of the variation in teacher qualifi-
cations occurred within rather than across dis-
tricts. Disadvantaged students are apt to
attend schools whose teachers have no more
than a B.A. degree, have undergraduate
degrees from less-competitive colleges, score
lower on various teacher tests, and have less
than full certification. 37 Similar results have
been found in other states and for other
measures of teacher quality. A Texas study
found that teacher mobility is much more
strongly related to the characteristics of stu-
dents, particularly race and academic achieve-
ment, than to salary.38 The researchers note
that they cannot be sure whether these find-
ings result from factors such as poor working
conditions, which correlate with student char-
acteristics. From the students’ point of view,
however, the consequences—less qualified
teachers—are the same.
On balance, it is not clear that the overall
level of teacher pay has led to a general
decline in the quality of teachers or to prob-
lems attracting an acceptable pool of candi-
dates to teaching. But it is clear that current
pay policies deny administrators the ability to
manage teacher resources to address short-
ages and priority areas for improvement. CED
believes that the structure of teacher pay must
be reformed.
This is by no means a novel recommenda-
tion, but it is one that has proven to be sur-
prisingly hard to implement. The status quo
suits many teachers, who have the political
strength to defend their preferences. Business
leaders and other interested citizens must
therefore support legislators and school
boards in efforts to institute pay reforms.
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How difficult or easy was it to fill the vacancies for this 
school year in each of the following fields? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Somewhat Could Not
Easy Difficult Very Difficult Fill Vacancy (3) + (4)
Elementary 
Education 67.6% 26.2% 5.5% 0.7% 6.2%
Special Education 25.5% 35.8% 32.8% 5.8% 38.6%
Math 29.0% 34.8% 33.3% 2.8% 36.2%
Biological Science 34.0% 38.5% 26.2% 1.3% 27.5%
Physical Science 31.7% 35.7% 30.2% 2.4% 32.6%
SOURCE: Michael Podgursky, The Single Salary Schedule for Teachers in K-12 Public Schools (discussion paper prepared for the Center
for Reform of School Systems, August 14, 2002), Table 2.
Figure 4
School Administrators’ Assessment of Difficulty in Filling Vacant Teaching Positions
APPROACHES TO TEACHER PAY
Teacher shortages and disparities in how
teacher resources are allocated across schools
are symptoms of an outmoded pay structure
unique to education: the single-salary sched-
ule. Even the federal government’s white-col-
lar pay system, the General Schedule, widely
criticized for its rigidities, allows for more flex-
ibility and experimentation than the typical
single-salary schedule used to set most teacher
pay.39 Flexibility and experimentation are
needed in education to make teacher pay
more market-driven.
Pros and Cons of the 
Single-Salary Schedule
The single-salary schedule is a grid for 
calculating teacher pay that reflects just two
teacher characteristics: number of years of
experience and number of credits and
degrees earned. Figure 5 shows an illustrative
schedule, with steps representing years of serv-
ice and, within each step, salary levels keyed
to degrees and additional credits.40 Districts
(and sometimes states) set these schedules, so
the particulars (such as how quickly salaries
rise or how long it takes to reach the top
salary level) vary from place to place. Teachers
may earn supplements above the schedule
amount, usually by taking on additional jobs,
such as coaching an athletic team, advising a
school club, or taking on instructional leader-
ship positions. Figure 6 shows that almost all
public school teachers are paid according to a
single-salary schedule. Most charter schools
and private schools also used such schedules,
though the percentages are significantly
lower. Moreover, research suggests that char-
ter and private schools adhere less rigidly to
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Figure 5
Typical Teacher Single-Salary Schedule, 1999-2000
Stepa Bachelor’s BA+15 Master’s MA+15 Doctor’s
1 $29,885 $30,421 $32,884 $34,662 $37,661 
2 31,793 32,326 34,770 36,548 39,547
3 33,141 33,677 36,420 38,195 41,197
4 34,512 35,048 37,768 39,547 42,547
5 36,677 37,213 39,675 41,454 44,452
6 38,304 38,839 41,561 43,337 46,338
7 39,932 40,468 43,466 45,245 48,243
8 41,839 42,375 45,652 47,431 50,429
9 44.023 44,559 48,095 49,872 50,872
10 46,467 47,002 50,815 52,594 55,592
11 49,165 49,700 53,792 55,570 58,571
12 52,457 52,993 57,084 58,863 61,861
13 54,606 55,142 59,212 60,990 63,989
14 56,229 56,755 60,834 62,613 65,611
a. Steps 1 – 10 each represent one year of service. Starting with the 11th year of service, annual step increases are replaced by
longevity steps; steps 12, 13, and 14 are payable upon completion of four years of service in steps 11, 12, and 13, respectively.
SOURCE: Alan Odden and Carolyn Kelley, Paying Teachers for What They Know and Do: New and Smarter Compensation Strategies to
Improve Schools, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2002), p. 10.
the schedules and exercise more discretion
when setting the pay of individuals.41
While teacher unions are today’s
staunchest supporters of single-salary sched-
ules, it is worth pointing out that this
approach to teacher pay goes back much fur-
ther than the emergence of unions in the
1960s. Single-salary schedules were adopted in
1921 in Denver and Des Moines; by 1950, 97
percent of all schools had embraced them.42
They spread because they were easy to admin-
ister and were perceived as fair. They provided
incentives for teachers to get full bachelor’s
degrees or more, which many teachers lacked
before mid-century. By treating teachers
equally except for experience and education,
single-salary schedules are believed by teach-
ers to contribute to a sense of collegiality nec-
essary for good teamwork, a hallmark of many
current instructional reform strategies.
As the prior discussion makes clear, howev-
er, single-salary schedules do not allow man-
agers to compete effectively for talent in high-
demand fields like math and science, and they
create no incentives to counter the demon-
strated preferences of better-qualified teach-
ers to work in schools serving higher achiev-
ing students. Moreover, though they pay
teachers for accumulating additional educa-
tional credits and degrees, they generally do
nothing to ensure that the investment in addi-
tional training bears any relationship to a
coherent plan for addressing either the indi-
vidual teacher’s or the school’s needs. Of
course, many teachers are motivated to seek
out valuable preparation; and the growth in
school-based accountability systems clearly
encourages this. But the structure of teacher
compensation does not create incentives that
reinforce self-motivation or motivate the
unmotivated.43
Furthermore, the traits rewarded by single-
salary schedules (experience and additional
education) appear to have little to do with
improving student outcomes. While
researchers have been able to identify effec-
tive teachers (those whose students show
achievement gains while in their classrooms),
they have not found experience and addition-
al education to be good predictors of who
these effective teachers are. Experience does
seem to have a positive effect on student
achievement for the first few years of a
teacher’s career, but not much after that.
Years of education and having a master’s
degree are not important determinants of stu-
dent outcomes. Most of the variation in stu-
dent achievement is not explained by the dif-
ferences among teachers rewarded on salary
schedules.44 There is some evidence that more
effective teachers perform better on tests of
verbal ability or on certification exams45 and
that the selectivity of the college a teacher
attended affects her students test score
growth.46 But this research base is not strong
enough to warrant a call for considering these
teacher traits when determining salaries
(though they would be useful factors to con-
sider in hiring decisions). In any event, a
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more reasonable approach would be to con-
sider actual student performance as part of
salary determinations, as we will propose in
the next chapter.
Supplementing the Single-Salary Schedule
There are some signs that districts and
states are trying new approaches to teacher
pay. Teacher unions have acknowledged the
need for changes in pay plans. Younger teach-
ers, in particular, appear to be open to more
far-reaching reforms than veterans.47
Many recent innovations in teacher pay
attempt to compensate for the shortcomings
of single-salary schedules rather than to
rebuild teacher compensation on a new foun-
dation. “Add-on” pay incentives can be useful
first steps in revising the single-salary sched-
ule, though they must be carefully targeted if
they are to alter the quality of the teacher can-
didate pool or the distribution of teachers.
Cynthia Prince48 has catalogued a variety of
incentives in use around the country with the
aim of increasing the pool of qualified teach-
ers: for example, signing bonuses for new
hires, especially in critical subject areas;
bonuses for teachers who demonstrate addi-
tional skills and knowledge (for example, by
receiving advanced certification from the
National Board for Professional Teaching
Standards); bonuses for teachers who agree to
work in hard-to-staff schools; housing incen-
tives such as relocation assistance, reduced or
free rent and utilities, teacher housing, low-
interest mortgages, and housing tax credits;
tuition assistance through scholarships and
loans or forgivable loans; and income tax
credits.
Efficient incentives will target bonuses and
other benefits so as to attract teachers to the
subjects and schools where they are most
needed and keep them there. Incentive pro-
grams often fail to target resources in this way.
Massachusetts, for example, initiated the
Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program for
New Teachers in 1998. It awarded $20,000
bonuses to highly-qualified individuals who
completed an alternative certification pro-
gram and taught full-time in public schools
for four years. The program did not require
that these teachers work in hard-to-staff
schools, however, and fewer than half of the
first year’s participants did. Moreover, the pro-
gram suffered from a high rate of attrition
(more than double the national average in
the first year of teaching). But the program
was not structured to create significant incen-
tives for staying; $8,000 was payable in the first
semester of teaching and $4,000 in each of
the next three years, with no obligation to
repay if the recipient left teaching. Making
bonus payments only after teachers had been
in the classroom for a year or two would very
likely have helped retention.49
In a similar vein, California’s income tax
credit for teachers is a costly way to encourage
retention of experienced teachers, who gener-
ally have rather low rates of attrition after the
first four or five years of teaching. Moreover, it
does nothing to address the problem of mald-
istribution of teachers among various subjects
and schools. The California credit is offered
to all teachers with at least four years of teach-
ing experience. Teachers with 4 to 5 years of
experience are eligible for a $250 credit each
year. More experienced teachers are eligible
for higher credits, up to $1,500 annually for
those with more than 20 years on the job. The
credit is estimated to cost the state $202 
million for school year 2002-03.50
To be effective in improving student learn-
ing, incentives must be targeted on the right
teachers. A number of scholarship and loan
programs aimed at attracting teachers to high-
poverty and hard-to-staff urban and rural
schools require recipients to begin teaching
in these schools right after getting their
degrees. Giving inexperienced instructors the
most difficult teaching assignments con-
tributes to high levels of attrition among new
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recruits. Incentives to take on these assign-
ments would be better targeted on more
experienced instructors.51
Loan forgiveness programs, moreover,
have been shown to have very little effect in
attracting students to teaching who would not
otherwise have taught. Fellowships or scholar-
ships with service payback requirements are
thought to be more successful.52
To be effective in changing teacher behav-
ior, incentives also have to be large enough to
matter. Earlier incentive programs have been
criticized on this account, and without better
evaluations it will be difficult for policy mak-
ers to know how much is enough. Some
researchers have suggested that pay raises of
20, 30, or even 50 percent would be necessary
to attract teachers to the most difficult
schools.53 Such findings are echoed in teacher
surveys showing that a large majority of teach-
ers would choose easier students and better
working conditions over more pay.54 Thus
attracting teachers to hard-to-staff schools will
need to be approached not just through pay,
but also through steps to improve working
conditions or improve the attractiveness of
these schools in other ways.
Replacing the Single-Salary Schedule
CED urges states and school boards to go
beyond add-ons to the single-salary schedule
and adopt a new, market-driven compensation
structure. This means using differential pay
for teachers in critical subject areas and in
hard-to-staff schools and allowing principals
greater discretion to use compensation as a
tool for achieving the educational goals of
their school.
It will take time and experimentation to
learn how best to implement market-driven
compensation. It is possible, though, to out-
line some desirable starting points.
Market-driven compensation suggests elim-
inating single-salary schedules (with cells com-
bining years of service and educational cred-
its) in favor of broader categories of instruc-
tional positions, such as the career, mentor,
and master teacher designations used in the
Teacher Advancement Program (sponsored by
the Milken Family Foundation; see Chapter
4). Within categories, principals should have
flexibility to pay competitive salaries to attract
and keep the teachers they need in specific
fields (as well as to reward performance, as we
will argue in the next chapter). In keeping
with our preference for decentralized deci-
sion-making (as outlined in Chapter 2), princi-
pals rather than district-level personnel should
make pay decisions in all but perhaps the
smallest districts. State salary schedules and
state laws requiring districts to adopt single-
salary schedules should be eliminated.
Managers will need to work together with
teachers and their unions to develop a new
basis for teacher pay, as experience shows
clearly that efforts to impose new approaches
on teachers unilaterally are doomed to fail.
The national leadership of two main unions
has shown some willingness to explore new
approaches. The American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) adopted a resolution in 2002
supporting continuation of the traditional
salary schedule but endorsing incentives for
teachers who agree to teach in low-perform-
ing schools, hard-to-staff schools, and/or
shortage areas. The National Education
Association (NEA) has shown more willing-
ness to consider differential pay for teachers
in hard-to-staff schools than differential pay by
subject area. Some local union affiliates have
gone beyond their national unions in their
willingness to work with local school boards
on pay reform. 
There are major challenges ahead in
changing the basis upon which teacher pay is
determined. Many design issues remain to be
resolved in moving toward reforms such as dif-
ferential pay. What kinds of teachers or assign-
ments should be rewarded? Should just new
hires or incumbent teachers as well qualify for
pay increments? Should long-term rather than
one-time inducements be offered? How much
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extra pay is enough to cause teachers to
change their behavior in ways that help school
managers staff their schools more effectively?55
We find it encouraging that younger teach-
ers appear more open than veterans to think-
ing about pay in new ways.56 We hope that this
translates into productive collaborations
between teachers and school boards in work-
ing out and evaluating new options.
Business leaders can spur fundamental pay
reform in several ways. They can give policy
makers the political support they will need to
change compensation systems. They can help
education leaders learn how to handle such
issues as using labor market surveys to set
competitive salary levels for different special-
ties. They can demonstrate how firms foster
collegiality and teamwork while acknowledg-
ing labor market realities that demand differ-
ential pay.
Districts willing to take on these challenges
can look for help to the federal “No Child
Left Behind” Act. Title IIA authorizes funding
($2.9 billion in 2003) for states and districts to
use in preparing, training, and recruiting
high-quality teachers and principals. Among
the approved uses of these funds is the devel-
opment and implementation of differential
pay as well as performance-based pay for
teachers and principals. 
REDUCING PENALTIES IMPOSED
ON MOBILE TEACHERS
CED recommends that policy makers
remove penalties that are imposed on teach-
ers who move from district to district or state
to state.
One type of penalty stems from the way the
single-salary schedule rewards experience.
Veteran teachers who transfer to a new district
typically receive only partial credit for their
prior service, typically only 5 or 6 years worth.
Over their teaching career, they may earn less
than they would have if they had remained in
their original district and received full credit
for all their years of teaching.
Likewise, mobile teachers generally qualify
for lower pensions than their colleagues who
do not move. Most teacher pension programs
(like public employment pensions programs
more generally) are structured as so-called
“defined benefit” programs, which base pen-
sion levels on a combination of years of serv-
ice and earnings in the last few years before
retirement. Since there is virtually no inter-
state reciprocity in teacher pension programs,
and some states even have multiple pension
programs which do not offer reciprocity with-
in the state, mobile teachers are likely to
receive lower pensions than teachers with the
same years of total service who stay within the
same state or district.
There are a variety of ways policy makers
might address these problems. Some states
have shortened vesting periods (the period of
service required before a worker becomes eli-
gible for a pension), have allowed partial vest-
ing, have made it easier for mobile teachers to
purchase “service credits” in their new pen-
sion plan, and have expanded intrastate reci-
procity. As of 1999, however, only Missouri
and Texas allowed interstate reciprocity agree-
ments. A few states have adopted optional
“defined contribution” plans for teachers.
Under such plans employers contribute a
specified amount annually to a retirement
account that is owned by the employee; the
ultimate pension benefit depends on the
amounts invested, the investment returns, and
the age at which pension payments begin.
Defined contribution pensions do not penal-
ize mobile workers to the extent that defined-
benefit plans do. Florida offers an example of
how a state can approach changes in its retire-
ment system in order to attract and retain tal-
ented public employees.57 (See text box,
“Pension Reform in Florida.”)
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In 2000, Florida enacted reforms to its public employee pension system, which covers teachers as
well as other state workers. A legislative study commission developed three primary goals for pension
reform in the state: to provide levels of income comparable to other retirement systems, to promote
consistency in the terms and benefits for public employees, and to keep benefits competitive. 
Among other things, the commission sought to improve portability in the pension system so as
not to unduly penalize workers who change jobs. A survey of education majors at Florida State
University, conducted as part of the commission’s work, found that these future teachers expect to be
mobile; they rated health and retirement benefits ahead of salary as important factors influencing
their decision to pursue teaching careers. 
The pension reform bill passed by the legislature established an optional defined contribution
plan for public school teachers and other state and local employees. Policy makers also took steps to
enhance the existing defined benefit plan by increasing employer contribution rates and by reducing
the number of years required for vesting. Employees are given two opportunities to switch from one
plan to another. 
SOURCE: Sandra S. Ruppert, Improving Pension Portability for K-12 Teacher (Denver, CO: State Higher Education Executive
Officers, February 2001).
PENSION REFORM IN FLORIDA
Traditional education funding policies do
not create incentives that encourage schools
to improve their performance. Historically,
schools have received their formula-deter-
mined share of funding from local, state, and
federal governments regardless of whether
their students were learning. Teachers and
principals likewise were paid with little or no
attention to student achievement. Other than
by moving or enrolling their children in pri-
vate schools, parents were largely unable to
exert pressure on public schools to perform. 
The advent of the “accountability” move-
ment accompanying standards-based reform
and culminating in the “No Child Left
Behind” Act (see text box, “‘No Child Left
Behind’ and Educational Accountability”)
means that it is no longer possible to say that
American education policy pays little atten-
tion to school performance. Still, there is
much to do to make sure that the incentives
created by funding policies reinforce the
importance of improved student achievement
and school performance. 
One avenue for improving financial incen-
tives lies in tying some part of the funding
that schools and/or the educators within
them receive to improved student learning. A
second kind of incentive seeks to encourage
improvement and innovation by broadening
the definition of what constitutes a “public
school” for funding purposes. It recognizes
new forms of school governance and manage-
ment, such as charter schools, that provide
alternatives to traditional district-run schools. 
Incentives can encourage undesirable as
well as desirable changes in behavior. We are
sensitive to this danger, and our recommenda-
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Chapter 4 
USING FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES
NCLB requires each state to define a “proficient” level of academic achievement in reading/
language arts and mathematics and to adopt an accountability system (based primarily on academ-
ic indicators) that requires “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) toward bringing all students up to a
proficient level within 12 years. The law requires progressively more extensive “corrective actions”
in schools and districts receiving federal education funds if students fail to meet AYP targets set out
in a federally-approved state plan. Corrective actions are triggered when a school receiving federal
funds fails to meet its AYP goal for two consecutive years and is therefore identified as needing
improvement. In the first year of school improvement, parents in the affected schools must be
given the right to transfer to better-performing public schools. In the second year of improvement
schools must also offer students the opportunity to receive tutoring from supplemental service
providers of the parents’ choice. Schools that continue to miss their AYP goals in subsequent years
face additional actions culminating after the fifth year in “restructuring.” This must involve one or
more of the following: reopening as a charter school, replacing all or most of the school staff, state
takeover of school operations, or other major restructuring of school governance.
“NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND” AND EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
tions about increasing the use of incentives
for improved performance seek approaches
that will minimize this risk. 
PERFORMANCE PAY 
The most obvious “missing” incentive in
education is the disconnect between teacher
pay and teacher performance. As we saw in
Chapter 3, the single-salary schedule rewards
only years of experience and credits and
degrees earned, neither of which has been
shown to be strongly related to teachers’ abili-
ty to improve student learning. Unfortunately,
while some essential qualities of effective
teaching (e.g., strong subject matter knowl-
edge) seem clear, it is impossible to identify
good teachers by their characteristics alone.
This fact has led to calls for rewarding teach-
ers with higher salaries and/or bonuses for
improving student outcomes, not just for 
time on the job or other formal educational
credentials.
CED is strongly in favor of linking some
part of teacher pay to improved outcomes for
students. This is, we recognize, a controversial
position that is very unpopular with teachers.
Moreover, most past efforts to institute some
form of performance pay have failed. It is easy
for individuals with various views to talk past
each other. Hot-button terms like “merit pay”
and “performance pay” mean different things
to different people. Suggestions to make pub-
lic sector pay reflect private sector models
often fail to acknowledge important differ-
ences in the legal and cultural environments
of the two sectors that powerfully affect what
will work in each. 
Without dismissing these differences, CED
believes that teachers (and other educators),
like virtually all other professionals, should be
evaluated on how well they perform on the
job. Some part of their pay should reflect this
performance. Good teachers should be
rewarded financially; ineffective teachers who
are unable to improve should not only see
poor performance reflected in their pay but
ultimately should be removed from the class-
room. We think that linking pay and perform-
ance is potentially one of the most important
tools available to policy makers for encourag-
ing strong candidates to enter teaching (know-
ing that effort and effectiveness will be
rewarded) and effective teachers to remain in
the classroom. We believe that it is possible to
develop pay-for-performance plans for educa-
tors that take into account teaching’s special
circumstances and the importance of encour-
aging joint as well as individual efforts on
behalf of students. We recognize that there is
still much to learn about how to structure
such plans so that teachers accept them and
students benefit from them. All school dis-
tricts should be working toward inclusion of
performance indicators in their evaluation
and compensation plans. It is no longer
acceptable to completely divorce compensa-
tion and performance as the traditional salary
structure does. 
Perspectives on Performance Pay
Definitional fuzziness complicates discus-
sion of pay-for-performance plans. Rewards
can be given to groups (e.g., all the teachers
in a particular school) or to individuals. Pay
increases can increase base salaries or be dis-
tributed as one-time bonuses that do not
result in base salary levels. Debates over
“merit” pay often fail to distinguish among
these options. It is crucial to be clear about
exactly what is at issue when proposals for pay-
for-performance are being considered.
The history of pay-for-performance in edu-
cation has led many to doubt its feasibility.
Over the last 30 or so years, a number of dis-
tricts have experimented with so-called merit
pay plans or with career ladders (which
sought to identify effective teachers and pro-
vide them with extra pay by giving them lead-
ership opportunities that often took them out
of the classroom). Few of these programs sur-
vived for long, and those that did tended to
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evolve into rewards for teachers who took on
extra work rather than those who performed
best. Among the problems that beset these
efforts were difficulties in establishing criteria
for teacher effectiveness, mistrust of the fair-
ness of performance appraisals by principals,
fears that pay bonuses (which were often
restricted to a small proportion of teachers)
would lead to competitiveness rather than
teamwork, and unstable funding that weak-
ened the incentive effect and also sent a sig-
nal that these pay-for-performance efforts
were not core elements of the educational
program.58
Private sector pay policies suffer similar
problems. Nevertheless, pay for performance
is widespread in the private sector. Some of
the solutions adopted by private sector firms,
however, are not easily implemented for
employees in a school setting. Explicit policies
that relate pay to specific measures of per-
formance are more easily applied to employ-
ees whose output can be easily observed (and
who may be rewarded through sales commis-
sions or piece rates). Even in the private sec-
tor, many employers base rewards more on
subjective evaluations of performance than on
quantitative performance outcomes.
Moreover, white-collar workers are often
rewarded through promotions, an option
much less available in teaching. While subjec-
tivity characterizes most firms’ approaches to
compensation, the private sector is not
immune from some of the consequences that
teachers fear, such as supervisors playing
favorites. Businesses compensate for some of
the difficulties with individual pay incentives
by also employing group incentives (such as
profit-sharing and group performance 
bonuses), while recognizing that these too 
are not immune from problems such as the
tendency of some employees to “free-ride” on
the efforts of others.59 Thus, performance pay
in education must be approached with honest
acknowledgement of the real challenges in
implementing it.
Moving to Performance Pay 
in Education
Some observers of teaching, sensitive to
the importance of teamwork and collegiality
among instructors in producing coherent edu-
cational experiences over time for students,
have argued that groups, rather than individu-
als, should be the focus of efforts to tie some
part of compensation to student outcomes. As
of 2002, seventeen states included some kind
of financial reward for good school perform-
ance in their accountability systems.60 Some
allowed or required financial rewards to be
distributed to teachers in the school, while
others required that the money be used for
educational programs but not for staff salaries
or bonuses. A few individual school districts
also provided performance-based group
bonuses to schools.
Group performance awards appear to be
more widely used than individual awards,
though a few districts have been exploring a
new approach to teacher compensation called
“knowledge- and skills-based (KSBA) pay.”61
KSBA systems attempt to avoid the problems
with failed merit-pay and career-ladder
approaches while rewarding teachers for
acquiring and demonstrating specific knowl-
edge and skills that should improve their
instructional effectiveness. KSBA can be
designed as an add-on to the single-salary
schedule or can modify or replace it entirely.
A major effort to build an entire KSBA system
was undertaken in Cincinnati. Although
important elements of the plan have been
incorporated into the union contract, teach-
ers rejected the part of the plan that would
have moved them off a single-salary schedule
to a salary structure linking pay to demon-
strated knowledge and skills. (See text box,
“Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay in
Cincinnati.”)
Knowledge- and skills-based pay provides
more direct incentives than does group 
performance pay for individual teachers to
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develop the specific skills that their schools
need and can thus be an important step in
moving individual teacher compensation away
from total reliance on the single-salary sched-
ule. Teachers and their unions have been
more willing to embrace these plans than they
have pay plans that link teacher compensation
directly to student outcomes. But, as we have
said before,62 we believe that some part of
individual pay should be linked directly with
teachers’ demonstrated ability to foster stu-
dent learning. 
Teacher effectiveness in the classroom
should probably be evaluated over several
years to avoid the instability inherent in annu-
al scores for small groups. Moreover, it is
important to measure changes in student per-
formance and not just absolute levels when
assessing teacher effectiveness, to help control
for the many factors affecting student learn-
ing that are outside the teacher’s control.
Such “value-added” evaluations make costly
new demands on testing and data systems.63
As in the private sector, effectiveness could
be evaluated through subjective performance
appraisals as well as objective performance
measures such as student test score gains.
Teachers have traditionally mistrusted subjec-
tive evaluations; but education is not alone
among occupations in needing to balance
judgment and fairness in performance
appraisals. We are confident that, like other
employers, educational managers and teach-
ers can find mutually acceptable methods of
doing so. Appraisals that involve fellow teach-
ers as well as administrators can help alleviate
concerns about fairness and impartiality. The
advantage to teachers (who fear being judged
on student scores alone, given there is much
in their students’ lives and behavior beyond
their control) is that a range of factors can be
taken into account in an appraisal process
that allows for judgment to be exercised.
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Cincinnati teachers and administrators worked together to design a knowledge- and skills-based
evaluation and compensation structure. The district developed specific standards that became the
basis for a new performance-based evaluation system and for teacher professional development.
Evaluation results are used to designate teachers as apprentice, novice, career, advanced, or accom-
plished teachers. To advance from apprentice (where all beginning teachers are placed), teachers
have to demonstrate higher levels of professional practice. Apprentices who fail to move to novice
status within two years are terminated, as are novice teachers who fail to advance to career status
within five years and career teachers who fall below this level on two successive evaluations.
The new evaluation system is operational in Cincinnati and is now part of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. However, in May 2002 teachers overwhelmingly rejected a new pay structure that set
broad salary ranges for each new teacher category. Under the new structure teachers who never
moved beyond, say, the career level would have salaries permanently lower than either advanced or
accomplished teachers, regardless of their years on the job. 
According to Education Week, many teachers feared that the new plan would have the effect of
lowering salaries. An offer by the district to give teachers already in the system the choice of opting
into the new plan came too late to be incorporated in the ballot or to be fully debated. At the time
of the vote, only about 10 percent of the district’s teachers had been through the new evaluation
system, which also led to much uncertainty about where they would end up on the new salary
schedule.
SOURCES: Allan Odden, “An Early Assessment of Comprehensive Teacher Compensation Change Plans,” in Marge L. Plecki
and David H. Monk, eds., School Finance and Teacher Quality: Exploring the Connections, 2003 Yearbook of the American
Education Finance Association (Larchmont, NY: Eye on Education, 2003); Bess Keller, “Cincinnati Teachers Rebuff
Performance Pay,” Education Week 21(38), May 29, 2002, p. 5.
KNOWLEDGE- AND SKILLS-BASED PAY IN CINCINNATI
In CED’s view, group awards, knowledge-
and skills-based pay, and pay for individual
teachers linked to their own students’ gains
are all promising ways of bringing desirable
incentives into teacher compensation systems.
Each admittedly has shortcomings, but these
can be minimized by designing pay systems
that combine the approaches. Group awards,
especially those administered as part of state
accountability systems, tend to be based on
student scores on statewide standardized tests
given in a limited set of subjects and grades;
they are thus subject to concerns about nar-
rowing of the curriculum and “teaching to the
test.” Group awards also raise fairness con-
cerns: some teachers may “free ride” on the
efforts of others, and some kinds of schools
(small schools, schools with diverse student
bodies) may have trouble winning awards
unless accountability systems take into
account the statistical challenges such schools
pose to measuring improvements in student
performance. By adopting their own group
and individual performance pay plans based
on a wider set of criteria, districts can help
ensure that deserving schools and teachers
are appropriately recognized. By offering 
individual as well as group awards, districts
can address the “free-rider” problem while
still rewarding teamwork within schools.
Knowledge- and skills-based pay can create
linkages that are absent in the single-salary
schedule between teacher professional devel-
opment and the specific improvement plans
of individual schools. Pay that reflects actual
student gains can give truly effective teachers
confidence that exceptional performance will
increase their ability to earn higher salaries
over their careers.
There are as yet few models of successfully-
implemented compensation systems that
embrace such a comprehensive reform of
teacher pay, but there are some pioneering
efforts that provide valuable information
about the substance and process of develop-
ing such plans. The Teacher Advancement
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TAP, launched in 1999 by Lowell Milken, describes itself as “a comprehensive, business-
oriented system with five interrelated principles: multiple career paths; market-driven com-
pensation; performance-based accountability; ongoing applied professional growth; and
expanding the supply of high quality teachers.”  The TAP model is meant to be adaptable to
diverse school districts and situations. 
The elementary and middle-school model provides for three basic career paths: career,
mentor, and master teacher. The high school model adds categories for first-year inductees,
adjunct teachers (a working professional with a partial class load), and faculty fellow (a distin-
guished, retired teacher asked to teach specific courses). TAP’s performance-based accounta-
bility system is far more elaborate than traditional teacher evaluation systems, with each
teacher evaluated numerous times by trained and certified evaluators and with performance
scored at five levels against TAP Effective Teacher Performance Standards. Student achieve-
ment is reflected in teacher evaluations through the use of value-added classroom achieve-
ment gains produced by the teacher, as well as the school achievement gains from year to
year. Teacher bonuses reflect student achievement as well as the teacher’s knowledge and
skills. Principals have the flexibility to compensate teachers based on their level along the
career path as well as their performance; principals are also encouraged to offer competitive
salaries to attract teachers for hard-to-staff schools and in hard-to-staff subjects.
SOURCE: Lowell Milken, Growth of the Teacher Advancement Program, Teaching as the Opportunity 2002, (Santa
Monica, CA: Milken Family Foundation, 2002).
THE TEACHER ADVANCEMENT PROGRAM (TAP)
Program (TAP), sponsored by the Milken
Family Foundation, aims to attract, retain, and
motivate the best talent to the American
teaching profession through a multipronged
approach to teacher evaluation and compen-
sation that recognizes teacher knowledge,
skills, and responsibilities; school-wide
achievement gains; and individual classroom
student achievement gains. TAP is currently
being implemented at more than 50 schools
in 6 states. (See text box, “The Teacher
Advancement Program.”) The Denver Public
School system and the Denver Classroom
Teachers Association (an affiliate of the
National Education Association) have just
completed a four-year joint pilot project
exploring several approaches to linking
teacher compensation with student achieve-
ment and are now in the process of develop-
ing a new salary structure that will be based,
in part, on student achievement. (See text
box, “Pay Reform in Denver.”) 
Pay-for-performance should encourage
teachers to become more effective, but it will
not save money and in fact is almost certain to
require additional spending. Performance
incentives will have to be large enough to
affect teacher behavior and will probably have
to result in increases over current pay levels to
induce teachers to move away from the com-
fortable single-salary schedule. Replacing 
ineffective teachers with effective ones will
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As they neared the end of a four-year pilot program experimenting with various forms of
performance-based pay in selected schools, Denver school district and union officials set up a
Joint Salary Task Force in 2002 to plan for expanding pay-for-performance throughout the dis-
trict. In May 2003 the task force issued a draft recommendation for “a bold new compensation
system” with three primary objectives:
• To link teacher compensation more closely with the district’s instructional goals.
• To reward and recognize teachers for meeting and exceeding expectations.
• To enable Denver Public Schools to attract and retain the most qualified and effective
teachers.
The draft proposed replacing the existing salary schedule for new teachers and for current
teachers who “opt in” with a compensation system that includes:
• Uncapped annual and career earnings for teachers who meet and exceed expectations.
• Annual and “sustained” bonuses for demonstrated student growth.
• Accelerated salary increases and bonuses for demonstrated acquisition of additional
knowledge and skills related to student growth and grounded in teachers’ instructional
disciplines.
• Market incentives for teachers of demonstrated accomplishment who choose to work
in schools and teaching assignments where high rates of teacher turnover have led to
lower student growth.
The task force laid out a timeline for discussion, development of final recommendations,
and collective bargaining, culminating in a March 2004 vote of both the union and school
board on whether to ratify a new compensation plan.
SOURCE: The Joint Task Force on Teacher Compensation, available at <www.denverteachercompensation.org>
Accessed October 30, 2003.
PAY REFORM IN DENVER
add to upward pressure on salaries. Teachers
must also have reason to believe that the
funds necessary to sustain performance-based
increases will be available; too often in the
past, innovative pay arrangements have
foundered after a short time as states or dis-
tricts failed to come up with the promised
funds. Payroll costs in the long term could
rise significantly if many teachers qualify for
performance-based pay, but limiting such pay
arbitrarily to some percentage of teachers (as
earlier merit pay plans often did) is likely to
spur opposition to new pay arrangements.
Districts will have to invest in professional
development to help both teachers and man-
agers understand and exercise their roles in a
new pay system. Business leaders and others
who support wider use of pay-for-perform-
ance plans in schools must also be prepared
to support the costs necessary to implement
and sustain them.
Pay-for-performance makes unprecedented
demands on data systems that were not
designed with teacher accountability or com-
pensation linked to student performance in
mind. More diagnostic tools (e.g., tests
aligned with curriculum that can be given fre-
quently to monitor progress) will also be
needed to assist teachers in tracking individ-
ual students’ learning more closely during the
course of the school year. 
Although this chapter has focused on
teacher pay, it has implications for administra-
tive salaries as well. Linking compensation to
improved outcomes for students is as applica-
ble to superintendents and principals as to
classroom instructors. Some superintendents
are already on formal performance contracts
of some kind. Increasingly states and districts
are giving principals financial rewards if their
schools raise student achievement. Houston
has gone a step beyond performance awards
by making all new principals (and veteran
principals who opt into the system) “at will”
employees in return for substantial increases
in their salaries. 
FUNDING NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
CED Trustees have long expressed concern
about how public schools are governed and
managed64 and have called for new institution-
al arrangements as well as for rethinking the
roles of traditional operating bodies such as
local school boards and state education agen-
cies. A decade ago, CED enthusiastically sup-
ported experimentation with the then-new
form of public schools called “charter
schools,” which operate autonomously, 
comparatively free from district and state reg-
ulations in exchange for agreements (“char-
ters”) to improve student achievement.† (See
text box, “Governance and Management in
Charter Schools.”) CED believed these
schools offered an important opportunity to
complement regular public schools and to
demonstrate the ability of site-managed
schools to meet student achievement goals in
a less restrictive regulatory environment than
that which (in CED’s view) too often hobbled
traditionally-operated schools.
The growth of charter schools over the last
decade has been remarkable, from 3 schools
in one state in academic year 1992-93 to 2700
schools in 39 states and the District of
Columbia in 2002-03. (See Figures 7 and 8.)
Enrollment has reached about 700,000 stu-
dents, and many schools have waiting lists.
While charter schools still represent a small
part of the public education universe (which
totals over 90,000 schools and roughly 48 
million students), they have spread much far-
ther and faster than any other institutional
alternative to the traditional public school.
CED continues to support the charter
school option and urge state policy makers to
adopt policies that will give these schools a
fair opportunity to be successful. Equitable
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† Most states use the term “charter school,” but a few have
adopted other names, such as “community school” in Ohio and
“public school academy” in Michigan.
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Charter schools provide an alternative to the tradition of giving district-based school
boards sole responsibility for the operation of all public schools within their geographic
boundaries. Instead, state legislation gives school boards and/or other entities (such as 
universities, mayors, state boards of education) the authority to grant charters to groups of
parents or teachers or others to run a school. Charter schools are freed from many of the
restrictions applied to traditional schools in exchange for agreeing to be accountable to their
authorizing agency for meeting objectives outlined in the charter. Charters are granted for
limited periods of time (typically five years). Schools that fail to meet their objectives or other
obligations (such as complying with financial or reporting requirements) under their char-
ters can be closed by their authorizers. While charter schools have many of the freedoms of
private schools to create their own educational programs, they cannot charge tuition, they
must be non-selective in enrollment, and they are subject to the same restrictions on religion
as public schools. State laws vary in how much freedom they grant to charter schools from
the regulations applied to traditional public schools, including the extent to which such
schools are bound by state and local teacher certification and salary rules and collective bar-
gaining arrangements. Charter schools are managed by their own governing board rather
than by public school boards or charter authorizers. Some charter school governing boards
have contracted with so-called educational management organizations (EMOs) to actually
run the school. While charter schools (like their traditional counterparts) are nonprofit,
many EMOs are profit-making companies who in turn report to their own boards of directors
and investors.
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS
Figure 7
Growth in the Number of Charter Schools: 1992-2002
SOURCE: Center for Education Reform as cited in, Bryan C. Hassel, “Friendly Competition,” Education Next, vol. 3, no. 1 
(Winter 2003), p.10.
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treatment of charter schools is taking on new
importance as urban reformers in several
large cities (Chicago, Los Angeles) are looking
to charter schools to broaden business and
civic leaders’ support for public education
and to model the development of high per-
formance schools for the entire district. We
are concerned about the obstacles that many
charter schools operators have faced, particu-
larly (given the thrust of this report) funding
policies that often put these schools at a dis-
advantage compared to those operated by 
traditional school boards.
We recognize that it is not yet clear
whether charter schools will ultimately fulfill
the promise envisioned for them of improving
student achievement and fostering innovative
and high quality educational programs. The
academic performance of charter school stu-
dents so far is mixed, with no evidence that
student achievement is dramatically better or
worse on average than students in traditional
public schools. Parents clearly are satisfied
with the charter school experiences of their
children, however, and most charter schools
are so new that it is really premature to draw
definitive conclusions about their potential
for improving student learning.65
Enacting charter school laws has been con-
tentious in many states; opponents have often
succeeded in limiting the number of schools,
skimping on funding, and/or imposing many
regulations. Current budget pressures are
causing some policy makers to ask whether
charters are affordable. Even the staunchest
charter school advocates point to some real
problems in the first decade’s experience with
this new form of public school.66 Some greedy
operators put making money before meeting
children’s educational needs; some authoriz-
ing bodies granted charters to operators who
established schools that were fiscally disastrous
and academically inadequate; and some man-
agement companies did not do their jobs 
well, despite charging large fees. Oversight
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Number of 
State charter schools Enrollment 
Total 2696 694,338
Alaska 15 2,682 
Arizona 464 73,542 
Arkansas 8 1,486 
California 428 153,935 
Colorado 93 25,512 
Connecticut 16 2,526 
Delaware 11 5,262 
District of Columbia 39 11,530 
Florida 227 53,350 
Georgia 35 15,117 
Hawaii 25 3,300 
Idaho 13 2,694 
Illinois 29 10,309 
Indiana 10 1,275 
Kansas 30 2,568 
Louisiana 20 4,631 
Massachusetts 46 14,013 
Michigan 196 ~70,000 
Minnesota 87 12,269 
Mississippi 1 334 
Missouri 26 12,130 
Nevada 13 2,851 
New Jersey 56 18,081 
New Mexico 28 4,234 
New York 38 10,954 
North Carolina 93 21,020 
Ohio 131 28,446 
Oklahoma 10 2,197 
Oregon 25 2,107 
Pennsylvania 91 33,656 
Rhode Island 7 914 
South Carolina 13 1,235 
Texas 221 60,562 
Utah 12 1,259 
Virginia 8 1,440 
Wisconsin 130 26,797 
Wyoming 1 110 
SOURCE: Department of Education, US Charter Schools: State
and School Information, available at <http://www.uscharter-
schools.org/pub/uscs_docs/gi/state_map.htm> Accessed
October 30, 2003.
Figure 8
Number of Charter School in Operation
and Total Charter School Enrollment 
by State: 2002-2003
and accountability have in some cases been
seriously deficient.
These abuses are certainly troublesome,
but not surprising in so new and unconven-
tional an undertaking. We see signs that both
state policy makers and charter school autho-
rizers have recognized the need to strengthen
oversight and accountability. Much more is
known now than 10 years ago about how to
exercise due diligence before charters are
awarded and perform ongoing reviews during
the period of the charter. The National
Association of Charter School Authorizers,
created in 2001, provides its members with
information on carrying out such duties as
evaluating charter applications and school
performance, negotiating accountability
agreements, and making renewal/revocation
decisions. Some states have recognized the
need to strengthen the capacity of their
authorizers, in part by ensuring that they have
the necessary funds to execute their responsi-
bilities conscientiously. 
We will never know if charters can fulfill
their promise, however, without giving them a
chance to compete on a level playing field
financially. The diversity of state funding for-
mulas for both traditional and charter schools
(and the absence of accurate school-level
budgets, as described in Chapter 2) makes it
impossible to make neat quantitative compar-
isons between regular and charter school
funding, but it is clear that charter schools
face a number of hurdles relating to operat-
ing expenses, start-up costs, and (most signifi-
cantly) facilities financing.
Charter schools get their public funds
through per-pupil funding systems.
Sometimes this funding is based on a state’s
average per-pupil expenditure. Sometimes
charter schools receive funding based on dis-
trict average revenues or expenditures. In
some states, charter schools negotiate their
funding with the chartering agency (which is
often a district school board). In addition to
base per-pupil funding, charter schools are 
eligible for a variety of state and federal cate-
gorical program funds.67
It is clear that at least some charter schools
face operating fund inequities under current
laws and practices. For example, New York
State funds its charter schools at about two-
thirds of regular per-pupil funding.68 For New
York City charter schools in 1999-2000, this
meant that charter schools received $6,207
per-pupil, while traditional public schools
received $9,739.69 California provides charter
schools with a block grant equivalent to what
traditional schools receive from so-called 
“revenue-limited funding” (the basic state
operating subsidy) and also a block grant in
lieu of some of California’s categorical educa-
tion funding. Some of the largest state cate-
gorical funding (as well as federal categorical
aid) falls outside the block grant, however.
Charter schools can apply separately for this
latter assistance, but do not fully participate in
these programs and so do not receive equiva-
lent funding.70 In states where charter schools
must negotiate their funding with authorizers,
charter operators may find themselves negoti-
ating with district officials who are less than
enthusiastic about sharing funds with these
new public entities. The result may be lower
per-pupil allotments, as well as problems for
charter schools in getting access to federal
and state categorical funds that flow through
districts. Sometimes charter school operators
are charged by districts for ill-defined services
from which they receive little or no benefit.
Not all funding disparities between charter
and regular schools advantage the latter. In
some places, charter schools receive equiva-
lent operating funds based on K-12 figures,
though the charter may only be serving ele-
mentary school students who are generally
thought to be less expensive than secondary
students. Sometimes charter school allotments
are based on regular funding formulas that
include services (such as transportation) that
the charter school may not provide. On bal-
ance, however, the consensus seems to be that
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in many cases charter schools are not receiv-
ing public funding equivalent to traditional
public schools.
Two other financial barriers hinder charter
school operations. Despite some federal fund-
ing available to help with start-up costs, the
need to begin paying for planning, staff, and
equipment before operating subsidies begin
flowing hobbles many operators. But the real-
ly big financial obstacle for most charter
schools is facilities.
From the charter school funding streams
we have been describing, charter schools must
pay to obtain and operate a school building.
This is a major difference from traditional
public schools, whose capital and mainte-
nance needs are largely met from separate
budgets and not from their operating funds.
School districts typically rely on bond issues to
pay for their buildings, an option largely
closed to charter schools. One analyst has esti-
mated that charter schools might have to pay
up to 20 percent or more of their operating
funds for their facilities, thus putting them at
a clear financial disadvantage with traditional
schools that can use their entire operating
budgets for their educational activities.71
Facilities are widely cited as the biggest
problem facing would-be charter operators.
Finding appropriate space complicates the
issue and raises the cost in tight real-estate
markets. Some states provide at least some
help with facilities funding and/or have poli-
cies that permit or require school districts to
lease available space. In California, schools
districts must make facilities available to char-
ter schools serving at least 80 in-district stu-
dents; districts can charge charter schools for
the use of the facilities and retain ownership
of the property. For charter schools serving
disadvantaged students and not qualifying for
this district assistance, California has a grant
program to help with facilities rent and lease
expenses. But a number of states provide no
facilities funds or other facilities assistance to
charter schools, and some state provisions tie
charters’ hands tightly. The New York charter
law, for example, prohibits charter schools
from “pledging, assigning or spending” their
public per-pupil funds to purchase, construct,
or improve a school facility, thus encouraging
charters to partner with organizations that can
help them acquire appropriate facilities.72
The New York experience points to a sub-
tle but potentially important consequence of
the failure to give charter schools a level
financial playing field. Some charter school
advocates believe that the educational innova-
tions it was hoped these schools would pro-
duce are more likely to arise from “visionaries
who create unique, grassroots charters,”
rather than from “sleek education manage-
ment firms.”73 Management firms can help
overcome the challenges of starting charter
schools by providing expertise and systems,
economies of scale, capital, and the capacity
to cultivate leaders and sustain schools over
time, but the pressures they feel to fill seats
may discourage them from embracing innova-
tions that may be unfamiliar to parents.74
Many charter school operators have turned to
partners (both nonprofit and profit-making)
to help them overcome financial and other
obstacles, but these partnership arrangements
can result in the partners, rather than the gov-
erning board of the school itself, having dis-
proportionate influence on decision-making.75
Fair funding policies for charter schools
may be especially important for urban school
reformers dealing with the most intractable
school improvement challenges. Many large
urban districts are “frozen systems” whose
bureaucratic controls, group entitlements,
and job protections have been largely left
intact by past reform efforts.76 In cities like
Chicago and Los Angeles, reformers impa-
tient with the failure of traditional strategies
to reverse decline in achievement and restore
public confidence are now looking to net-
works of charter schools as the best hope for
leveraging change. Business and other civic
leaders are providing the impetus behind the
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Los Angeles effort, while in Chicago these
leaders are supplying crucial support for a dis-
trict-initiated charter strategy. (See text box,
“Charter Schools and Education Reform in
Chicago and Los Angeles.”)†
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Chicago Public Schools officials, acknowledging problems such as their inability to turn
around their poorest performing high schools, have used charter schools as a way to create
alternatives. The districts has sought charter school applications from groups prepared to
serve needs identified by the district and has worked with local university and business leaders
to create a rigorous proposal review process to help ensure that approved schools would be
capable of carrying out their missions. The district Chart Schools Office actively works with
business-backed groups such as the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago and
Leadership for Quality Education in supporting charter school efforts. Chicago Public
Schools provided $2 million to create a low-interest revolving loan fund for charter school
facility and start-up needs. The fund is managed by the Illinois Facilities Fund, a nonprofit
community development financial institution. Chicago Public Schools officials supported a
successful 2003 effort to persuade the state legislature to increase the ceiling on the number
of charter schools in Chicago from 15 to 30. 
In Los Angeles, an alliance of civic and business leaders commissioned WestEd, one of the
nation’s Regional Educational Laboratories, to help the group understand the governance
and structural barriers inhibiting reform from taking hold in the district. The Los Angeles
Alliance for School Achievement also sought to learn how it could effectively exert leverage to
help the schools improve. 
Following the study’s recommendations, the Alliance has launched “College-Ready Public
Schools,” a network of independent charter schools within the Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD). These schools will be authorized by LAUSD but will (unlike Chicago’s) be
fully autonomous within the district rather than affiliated with the traditional system. The net-
work aims to enhance district capacity while fostering innovation, joint problem solving, and
sharing of best practices. WestEd outlined several elements though which the Alliance’s net-
work could support charter schools, including strong learning goals and accountability meas-
ures for each school; an incubator for new charter schools; coordinators to facilitate network
collaboration and the development of communities of practice; support for high-quality pro-
fessional development; a comprehensive data system; outreach and advocacy; and research
and evaluation. College-Ready Public Schools plans to open a minimum of 20 small public K-
8 and high schools in Los Angeles by the fall of 2008 and ultimately envisions a network of up
to 100 public schools. The first schools will open in the fall of 2004.
SOURCE: WestEd, Creating Excellence for All Students: Transforming Education in Los Angeles, (recommendations from
WestEd to the Los Angeles Alliance for School Achievement, San Francisco, CA, 2003).
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION REFORM IN CHICAGO 
AND LOS ANGELES
† Given the renewed interest in tax-supported vouchers for pri-
vate education in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2002 deci-
sion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, we should note that we did
not address the voucher question in this report on funding
policies for public schools. Advocates argue that publicly-fund-
ed vouchers will encourage some of the same innovation and
improvement that we hope to find in charter schools.
Nevertheless, in earlier reports CED Trustees have expressed
grave reservations about using scarce public resources, which
would otherwise be available to improve public education, to
support vouchers. In our 1994 report Putting Learning First:
Governing and Managing the Schools for High Achievement, we did
not find the arguments supporting vouchers persuasive enough
to reverse our long-standing objection to using public funds to
support private education. Before changing this position, we
would need to investigate issues that go beyond those exam-
ined in the current study. In particular, we would need to
review the evidence about the experience to date with vouchers
and their effect on student achievement, social diversity, and
other important goals of the education enterprise. We would
also need to evaluate a series of policy issues—e.g., related to
admissions policies, accountability provisions, and whether sup-
plemental tuition may be charged—that were not part of our
current research.
In earlier chapters this report has identi-
fied a number of ways in which school finance
policies and practices should be changed so
that resources are used as efficiently and effec-
tively as possible to improve student learning.
Even if all our recommendations are adopted,
however, an important question will remain:
Are the financial resources available to dis-
tricts and schools adequate to accomplish the
goals being set for them?
This question has taken on new urgency in
the era of standards-based reform because, for
the first time, states are spelling out in detail
what students should know and be expected
to do; and federal and state governments are
imposing sanctions on students and schools
that fail to meet these standards. The “No
Child Left Behind” Act requires states to
make many costly changes in their education
systems, though the extent to which these new
mandates will be accompanied by the federal
funds needed to implement them is presently
unclear.
In this new political context, the familiar
approach to decision-making about school
finance—political bargaining over how much
revenue to raise and how to distribute it, with
little or no reference to the cost of meeting
standards—no longer suffices. Legislatively-
determined academic standards (reinforced
by accountability provisions) imply a legisla-
tive obligation to provide sufficient resources
so that all students will have the opportunity
to meet these standards. For policy makers in
a number of states, courts are adding to the
pressure to link funding levels to expected
educational outcomes as judges rule that the
state is constitutionally required to provide an
“adequate” education for all children.
Today’s political and judicial environments
pose two tough school funding challenges for
policy makers: how to determine what the
public’s educational goals should cost and
how to raise the revenues necessary to fund
those costs. Determining the costs of meeting
educational standards requires new approach-
es to setting funding formulas. Raising the
necessary revenues requires addressing out-
dated tax structures that do not keep up with
public demands for services and that lead to
harmful “boom and bust” cycles of program
expansion and contraction. Addressing these
challenges poses difficult technical and politi-
cal issues. Policy makers need the support
and help of business leaders and others in
designing a new, standards-based approach
for funding the nation’s schools and in build-
ing the political will to overcome “business as
usual” on these controversial tax-and-spend
issues.
MEETING THE COSTS OF 
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS
Until the last 30 years or so, there was little
on which states and districts could base their
decisions about educational funding levels
except comparisons with other states, histori-
cal spending patterns, and the political envi-
ronment for raising and spending public
funds. The advent of standards-based reform
as the dominant strategy for improving the
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Chapter 5 
SCHOOL FUNDING AND 
THE COSTS OF MEETING 
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS
nation’s schools has, at least in principle, pro-
vided a basis for linking funding to education-
al objectives. 
While we would prefer that governors and
legislators rather than judges undertake to
make this link, we recognize that, in the after-
math of the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education
decision ending racial segregation in schools,
courts have provided much of the impetus for
education reform generally and school
finance reform specifically. In about half the
states (see Figure 9) courts have ruled that
state constitutional requirements impose edu-
cation funding obligations on policy makers.
The first round of school finance cases
(beginning with Serrano vs. Priest in California
in the early 1970s) sought to force legislatures
to deal with gross inequities in school funding
across districts resulting from differences in
property wealth. More recently, court cases
have focused on the adequacy of state fund-
ing, basing arguments on the so-called educa-
tion clauses in virtually all state constitutions
that require the state to provide an “ade-
quate” or “thorough and efficient” or “basic”
(or some other adjective) education to the
state’s children.
Both standards-based reform and court
decisions requiring states to fund an adequate
education are explicitly tied to questions
about what students are supposed to learn
and to what standard of achievement. Both
approaches imply absolute criteria for accept-
able performance (e.g., how much does some
standard of performance cost?), rather than
relative criteria (e.g., are students in State A
learning more or better funded than students
in State B?). However, the standards set by leg-
islatures or state boards of education may or
may not coincide with court requirements.
The key issue for a court is what a state’s con-
stitution requires; legislatures or state boards
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SOURCE: The ACCESS Project, available at <www.accessednetwork.org> Accessed October 30, 2003.
Current as of September 2, 2003
Figure 9
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might choose to adopt a higher standard.†
Some state courts have chosen to be quite 
specific about what constitutes “adequacy.” In
other states, courts have deliberately side-
stepped the question, leaving it up to legisla-
tive or executive branch agencies to decide.
No matter what state entity specifies the
state’s educational objectives, the question
then becomes how much money schools will
need to give students the opportunity to reach
these goals.†† The litigation over school
finance adequacy has resulted in the first
attempts to develop a systematic process for
determining funding levels required to meet
educational objectives. The process begins
with specifying the goals to be achieved and
then estimates the costs of reaching them
through one of several emerging methods.77
While these so-called costing-out methods are
still rather crude, they are constantly being
refined and will undoubtedly improve as they
are more widely used and their results are
examined and debated. 
Working through a costing-out analysis
cannot replace the political process by which
elected officials weigh competing demands on
scarce state resources. Moreover, the state of
knowledge about how to improve student
learning is such that establishing adequate 
levels of funding is still more art than science.
Nevertheless, we think the California Joint
Committee to Develop a Master Plan got the
promise of adequacy right when it recently
urged the state to modify its public school
financing systems: an analytical “process of
determining the adequacy of resources is an
important advance over historical approaches
of allocating money on the basis of what is
available annually or how far above or below
the national average a state is. It also furthers
the goals of accountability by explicitly
acknowledging a link between what is expect-
ed from public schools and the resources pro-
vided to meet those expectations. Further, it
enables state policy makers and taxpayers to con-
sciously determine if they can afford to invest the
resources needed to realize the education system they
envision.” 78
We urge all states to build analytical meth-
ods for determining the costs of meeting stan-
dards into their consideration of education
funding. To ensure that costs are fairly reflect-
ed, policy makers should take several factors
in addition to educational standards into
account. Finance formulas should reflect the
fact that children come to school with a diver-
sity of educational needs and that schools in
different parts of the state face different costs
for educational services that are beyond their
control. These factors can be incorporated
into finance formulas by using weights that
provide extra funding for students with spe-
cial education needs and by including geo-
graphic cost adjustments. Many states already
do some version of the former, though the
weights they use are very different, suggesting
the need for more research on the additional
costs of addressing special educational needs.
Very few states currently make geographical
adjustments, even though several methods are
available for doing so. Additional adjustments
for especially small or especially large schools,
to account for the higher costs that may be
experienced in operating such schools, may
also be appropriate.79
A cost-based approach to setting school
funding levels also requires attention to keep-
INVESTING IN LEARNING 
42
†† Whether court-mandated adequacy requires funding to
ensure all students the opportunity to reach standards or fund-
ing to ensure that all students actually reach the standard is not
always clear. Some courts do specify “opportunity,” and this
seems a more manageable (albeit still very difficult) approach,
so we focus on it here.
† In New York State, for example, the state’s highest court
noted in a June 2003 ruling in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
that a “sound basic education” (which a 1982 court decision
defined as the constitutional standard in New York) could not
be equated to the Regents Learning Standards adopted in 1996.
“[S]o to enshrine the Learning Standards would be to cede to a
state agency the power to define a constitutional right.” Instead,
the court based its ruling on whether the state was affording
school children “the opportunity for a meaningful high school
education, one which prepares them to function productively as
civic participants.”
ing cost-of-education estimates up to date by
adjusting them for inflation over time. The
failure to make inflation adjustments was a
key reason why state “foundation grant” levels
widely used during much of the 20th century
fell increasingly below the costs of providing
even a minimal education. We suggest that
inflation factors appropriate to education
should be built into annual state budget for-
mulas and that every few years a formal study
should be undertaken to review and revise the
adjustment factors.
Likewise, we suggest that states should peri-
odically undertake new studies to determine
the costs of meeting their educational stan-
dards. As we have already indicated, improved
methods of conducting these studies should
become available as more experience is
gained with them. Educational standards may
change, requiring new analyses of the costs of
meeting them. And, if the policies and prac-
tices we have recommended in this report
become more widespread, effectiveness and
efficiency will improve in ways that should be
reflected in costing-out studies.
We have emphasized state financing for-
mulas in this discussion of the costs of meet-
ing standards because in both the political
and judicial realms it is increasingly clear that
the state bears the primary responsibility for
ensuring that funding levels are set so that all
children have the opportunity to achieve the
standards. As we have said before, however,80
we believe that school districts should carry a
reasonable share of school financing because
of the benefits individuals and their local
communities receive from education. Our
own view continues to be that there are effi-
ciency reasons for including some local
finance and encouraging localities to care
about the operation of their schools by allow-
ing them room to increase spending above
the adequate level (at least up to some point)
if they so choose. We recognize, however, that
this is increasingly a question that courts,
rather than legislators, are deciding and that
courts are not of one mind about the legality
of allowing spending to vary by location once
adequacy for all students is assured. The
supreme court in Wyoming, for example,
expressly prohibited district “add-ons” to the
state-determined cost of education, while its
counterparts in New Hampshire and North
Carolina expressly allowed them. 
REFORMING STATE 
TAX STRUCTURES
The central role that states play in school
finance makes the question of their capacity
to fund educational standards a critical one.
Both state and federal governments face 
serious budget problems. CED has called
attention to the harmful societal conse-
quences of large and persistent federal
deficits.81 While federal deficits matter for
education, state budget woes threaten to have
an even greater impact on schools, given the
relatively greater importance of state spending
and the fact that states, unlike the federal gov-
ernment, may generally not run deficits.
Solutions for state budget problems are
beyond the scope of this report but are likely
to require fundamental changes in how states
raise revenues.
State budgets are currently in dire straits
because of conditions in the broader econo-
my, but even when the economy improves
many experts question how fast (or if) state
fiscal health will return. State programs may
be in jeopardy long after the national econo-
my recovers from its current slump because
(1) many states appear to be suffering from
“structural deficits,” meaning that public rev-
enues are not growing as fast as incomes and
as demands for public services; and (2) state
tax revenues are quite volatile, resulting in
“boom and bust” cycles of program expansion
and contraction that can be devastating for
people dependent on state-funded programs.
Meeting the cost of education standards
forces advocates to address larger questions of
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what they want state governments to do and
whether state revenue systems are equal to the
task.
Economist Alice Rivlin raised this chal-
lenge in a Brookings Institution policy brief
on the mismatch between state tax structures
and the demands being placed on them. She
points clearly to the danger of ignoring this
challenge: “Politics, plus pressure to hold
down tax rates for fear of losing jobs and
affluent people, may result in under-funding
services that most citizens favor and that
would help the economy grow.”82
States’ capacity to meet the cost of educa-
tional standards may depend on their success
in overcoming structural deficits and protect-
ing their revenues from sharp cyclical swings
that lead to program cutbacks.
Many tax experts believe that states face
structural deficits because their tax systems
have not kept up with economic changes and
with the growing responsibilities with which
states are charged. Many state services (educa-
tion, medical care, social services) are people-
intensive services whose costs tend to rise in
step with real wages. Sales taxes revenues, his-
torically the mainstay of state budgets, do not
grow at the same rate. Income taxes produce
revenues that rise in step with (or even a little
ahead of) wages, yet only in 1998 did personal
income taxes replace sales taxes as the single
most important state revenue source. Nine
states, however, still lack a broad-based per-
sonal income tax.
State sales and use taxes are also eroding
as economic changes outstrip states’ ability
and willingness to adjust them. Services, as
opposed to goods, now constitute the majority
of personal consumption but are exempt
from taxation in most states that impose sales
taxes. Remote sales (via mail, telephone, and
the Internet) are a growing source of con-
sumption, but states’ ability to tax these sales
has been severely restricted by actions of
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Interstate tax competition has, in the view
of many tax experts, reduced the progressivity
of state tax systems and led states to grant tar-
geted tax incentives that have changed corpo-
rate income and other state taxes in a variety
of undesirable ways. Excise taxes, a smaller
but still important source of state revenues,
are levied on a per unit rather than a cost
basis and thus do not tend to keep pace with
price levels. Moreover, they are regressive and
impose disproportionate burdens on poorer
taxpayers.
In addition to these structural problems,
states are now facing budget pressures in part
because they inadequately prepared for eco-
nomic downturns, the most recent of which
began in 2001. In the boom times of the mid-
to-late 1990s, 43 states enacted large tax cuts.
Those that made the largest cuts are in the
worst fiscal trouble now. Most states have nei-
ther reversed these cuts nor enacted other tax
increases to replace the lost revenue.83 When
states have increased taxes, they have tended
to emphasize excise and sales taxes, thus exac-
erbating their longer-term revenue problems.
While many states set aside “rainy-day
funds” during the 1990s, these reserve
accounts have not proven large enough to
protect states from the need to raise taxes or
cut expenditures in the current downturn.
Healthy reserves are increasingly important,
however, as states depend more heavily on
income taxes, because these tax revenues are
more sensitive to economic downturns than
other important states taxes like sales and
excise taxes. Shortcomings in current “rainy
day fund” policies highlight the need to begin
thinking now about changes that can help
such funds do a better job of protecting state
programs in future fiscal crises.
The structural and cyclical problems with
state revenues are technically and politically
complicated. Addressing them forthrightly,
however, is an important element in ensuring
that states have the capacity to meet their 
educational goals.
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Appendix
HOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE FINANCED 
IN THE UNITED STATES
Because education is not mentioned in the
federal constitution, elementary and second-
ary schools have historically been viewed as
the responsibility of the states, which in turn
delegated this responsibility to local school
districts. Until the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury, localities raised the majority of revenues
for public schools, primarily through property
taxes.
The decentralized nature of school finance
has led to very different patterns of burden-
sharing between state and local governments
and sizeable differences in per pupil expendi-
tures across the nation.
State education aid to localities began as a
way of ensuring that districts could provide at
least a basic education to their students.
Originally, this aid was provided largely
through flat grants of a specified amount per
student. Flat grants gave way in most states to
foundation grants (which guaranteed districts
a specified amount of funding per student
from a combination of state and local tax
sources) and/or guaranteed-tax-base grants,
which guaranteed that districts levying the
same tax rates would receive the same levels
of revenues. These latter forms of state aid
were intended to compensate for the large
differences in property tax wealth among dis-
tricts, which led to large per-pupil spending
differences within individual states. In addi-
tion to these forms of general operating aid,
states also provide funding to local districts
and schools through a variety of categorical
programs. These can run into many dozens in
some states, covering a range of purposes
from textbook purchases to transportation to
teacher development. 
Federal dollars also flow through categori-
cal programs, mostly from the Department of
Education. The largest federal program is the
Title I compensatory education program,
which provides grants to states and districts
for educating disadvantaged students. The
next largest Department of Education pro-
grams assist students with disabilities and stu-
dents in vocational and adult education.
Large programs outside the Department of
Education include child nutrition programs
(Department of Agriculture), Head Start
(Department of Health and Human Services)
and the education component of training pro-
grams (Department of Labor). 
Revenue Sources for Public Schools,
Selected Years, 1920-2000
School Year Federal State Locala
1919-1920 0.3 16.5 83.2 
1929-1930 0.4 16.9 82.7 
1939-1940 1.8 30.3 68.0 
1949-1950 2.9 39.8 57.3 
1959-1960 4.4 39.1 56.5 
1969-1970 8.0 39.9 52.1 
1979-1980 9.8 46.8 43.3 
1989-1990 6.1 47.2 46.8 
1999-2000 7.3 49.5 43.2
a. Includes a small amount from nongovernmental sources.
These sources accounted for 2.4 percent of total revenue in
1999-2000.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2002, NCES
2003-060 (Washington, D.C.: NCES, 2003), Table 156.
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Mirroring financing patterns, governance
of America’s public schools is highly decen-
tralized and fragmented. Along with taking on
more financial responsibilities, states have
grown in influence over instructional matters
formerly left to districts. School reform efforts
of the past 20 years have made states key 
players in setting educational standards and
permitting (or not) the creation of new kinds
of public schools such as charter schools.
Federal influence over elementary and 
secondary education far exceeds Washington’s
share of financing, because virtually all dis-
tricts and many schools received federal 
dollars and therefore can be subjected to 
federal regulations.
Educational finance and governance is fur-
ther complicated by the diversity among states
in the number and size of their local districts.
Hawaii is a single, state-wide district. Maryland
has 24 districts, coterminous with its counties.
At the other extreme, California, Illinois, and
Texas have over a thousand districts each.
Only 13 states have fewer than 100 districts. 
K-12 education is more centralized, though,
than the existence of nearly 15,000 school dis-
tricts would suggest. While districts reflect an
enormous range of size, a third of American
public schoolchildren are enrolled in just 
1.5 percent of all districts, those with 25,000
students or more.
Sources of School Revenue and Per-Pupil Expenditures by State, 1999-2000
Current Expenditure
Federal State Locala Per Pupilb
United States 7.3% 49.5% 43.2% $7,392 
Alabama 9.1 62.2 28.8 5,758 
Alaska 15.4 58.9 25.7 9,668 
Arizona 10.8 43.6 45.7 5,444 
Arkansas 8.8 60.2 30.9 5,628 
California 8.7 60.3 31.0 6,401 
Colorado 5.4 41.3 53.3 6,702 
Connecticut 4.1 40.2 55.7 10,122 
Delaware 7.5 65.6 26.9 8,809 
District of Columbia 20.4 n/a 79.5 11,935 
Florida 8.4 49.5 42.1 6.383 
Georgia 6.6 47.9 45.5 6,903 
Hawaii 9.0 88.8 2.1 7,090 
Idaho 7.7 61.1 31.1 5,644 
Illinois 7.7 30.8 61.5 8,084 
Indiana 5.3 52.3 42.5 7,652 
Iowa 6.1 50.6 43.3 6,925 
Kansas 6.3 62.4 31.4 6,962 
Kentucky 10.0 60.7 29.3 6,978 
Louisiana 11.5 49.5 39.1 6,256 
Maine 8.0 44.6 47.4 8,247 
Maryland 5.6 39.0 55.4 8,273 
Massachusetts 5.3 43.7 51.0 9,317 
Michigan 6.8 64.6 28.6 8,886 
Minnesota 4.8 60.0 35.2 7,499 
Mississippi 13.7 56.2 30.1 5,356 
Missouri 6.6 37.6 55.8 6,764 
Montana 12.2 44.7 43.1 6,990 
Nebraska 6.9 36.6 56.5 7,360 
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Appendix
Public Schools Districts and Enrollment,
by Size of District, 2000-2001
Enrollment Number of Percent of Percent of
Size Districts Districts Students 
Total 14,859 100 % 100 %
100,000 or more 24 0.1 12.2
25,000 to 99,999 216 1.5 20.2 
10,000 to 24,999 581 3.9 18.8 
5,000 to 9,999 1,036 7.0 15.3 
2,500 to 4,999 2,060 13.9 15.5 
1,000 to 2,499 3,448 23.2 12.0 
600 to 999 1,776 12.0 3.0 
300 to 599 2,107 14.2 2.0 
1 to 299 3,265 22.0 1.0 
Size not reported 346 2.3 — 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2002, NCES 2003-
060 (Washington, D.C.: NCES, 2003), Tables 36, 88 and 92. 
Current Expenditure
Federal State Locala Per Pupilb
Nevada 5.0 29.1 65.9 6,148 
New Hampshire 4.4 55.8 39.9 7,082 
New Jersey 3.9 41.2 55.0 10,903 
New Mexico 14.4 71.5 14.4 5,835 
New York 5.8 44.8 49.5 10,957 
North Carolina 7.1 67.6 25.3 6,505 
North Dakota 12.9 40.2 46.9 6,078 
Ohio 5.8 42.5 51.7 7,816 
Oklahoma 9.9 58.4 31.7 5,770 
Oregon 6.8 57.1 36.1 8,129 
Pennsylvania 6.4 37.8 55.8 8,380 
Rhode Island 5.8 41.3 52.9 9,646 
South Carolina 8.4 52.8 38.9 6,545 
South Dakota 12.5 34.5 53.0 6,037 
Tennessee 9.0 45.8 45.2 5,837 
Texas 8.6 44.2 47.3 6,771 
Utah 7.5 59.2 33.4 4,692 
Vermont 6.7 73.6 19.6 8,799 
Virginia 5.7 42.6 51.8 6,491 
Washington 7.3 63.5 29.2 6,914 
West Virginia 9.5 61.7 28.8 7,637 
Wisconsin 4.8 54.0 41.3 8,299 
Wyoming 8.4 51. 9 39.7 7,944 
a. Includes a small amount from nongovernmental sources.
b. Current expenditures are in unadjusted dollars per pupil based on average daily attendance. They do not include capital outlay
and interest on school debt.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2002, NCES 2003-060
(Washington, D.C.: NCES, 2003), Tables 157 and 186. 
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On the report as a whole, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
with which PETER A. BENOLIEL, WILLIAM E.
BROCK, and CAROL R. GOLDBERG have
asked to be associated.
I am enthusiastic about the first four chap-
ters of the report. I think they are excellent
and reflect a great deal of careful study.
I am less enthusiastic about Chapter 5.
The first-half of Chapter 5 appears to endorse
(albeit passively) the idea that judges have
and should have a constitutional right to
mandate total state education budgets to
make sure that they are “adequate,” regard-
less of any or all other problems faced by a
state legislature and governor. I believe that
this is an undemocratic and impractical
notion that in the long term will do much
harm both to education budgets and the
proper role of the judiciary. If good gover-
nance means anything, setting total budgets
(and raising the revenues to pay for them) is
the job of the legislature and the governor.
Judges have an important role to address
illegal and unconstitutional budget distribu-
tions that deny equal protection but surely
judges do not and should not have the power
to enact budgets or mandate the collection of
tax revenues. The statement should make this
point clearly and strongly.
The second part of Chapter 5 offers a
number of comments about the current sta-
tus of state budget and tax systems. This is an
important topic and would deserve a careful
study and statement by CED. As important as
the topic is, however, I do not think it is use-
ful to offer a collection of ad hoc comments
on tax policy that have not been the subject
of a careful CED study process. The com-
ments offered do not represent a coherent
proposal. It’s a mistake to publish them as a
tag-along to a statement on education.
On the report as a whole, JOSH S. WESTON
with which PETER A. BENOLIEL, WILLIAM E.
BROCK, and CAROL R. GOLDBERG have
asked to be associated.
This policy statement covers important
ground in turning around the nation’s public
schools. No organization, be it public or pri-
vate, can achieve its goals without competent
systems for leadership, motivation, enhanced
productivity, and recognition; our public
school system generally lacks all four.
As this statement goes to press, new atten-
tion is being paid to the matter of work rules
as they are codifies in elaborate contracts with
the major unions involved in public educa-
tion. In New York City, Councilwomen Eva
Moskowitz has noted that union rules prohib-
it people hired to sweep the floors from vacu-
uming the rugs on those floors, and limit 
custodians to painting walls below a certain
height.
The problem of work rules goes further
than these examples, as this policy statement
demonstrated. It is reflected in seniority rules
that allow older teachers to cream-skim the
system for jobs in the least difficult schools;
and uniform pay scales don’t distinguish
between disciplines in long and short supply.
All of these problems have their roots in
the union contracts. Teacher unions have
played an important role in getting better
environments and compensation for teachers.
But it is not “anti-union” or “anti-worker” to
insist that school systems have the flexibility
to effectively evaluate, reward, and deploy
workers. That includes assigning or incentiviz-
ing teachers to shift low-performance schools,
and allowing maintenance staffs to move
among different tasks while on an 8-hour day.
Indeed, unless the unions come to grips with
the crisis in our schools and play a positive
role in moving forward, they risk isolating
themselves in future rounds of negotiations.
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation, or Dissent
On the report as a whole, JOHN BRADEMAS.
In my 22 years as a Member of Congress, I
helped write nearly all the Federal legislation
dealing with education. On reading this state-
ment, I am struck by how many of the issues
remain.
I applaud the emphasis on more business-
like management of public schools but the
argument that this is the key to improving 
student learning gives too little weight to such
factors as per-pupil expenditures, qualified
teachers, parental involvement, students with
special need, poverty, race, and language.
Nor does the statement reflect sufficiently
the economic and political realities surround-
ing school reform. The Federal deficit will be
$521 billion while most state budget are also
in deficit. Yet two years after enactment of the
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the report
ignores the increasing criticisms that, con-
fronted with mandates imposed by the
Federal government, schools are not provided
the Federal funds promised to implement the
statute. 
Instead, calling for “a level playing field,”
the report urges more spending on charter
schools and describes public schools as 
“a monopoly,” language that undermines 
business support for public schools.
The report speaks only reluctantly of the
importance, in attracting qualified teachers,
of compensation, focusing instead on giving
administrators authority to link “some part of
individual pay directly with teachers’ demon-
strated ability to foster student learning.”
The report states that “the extent to which
[the] new mandates [of NCLB] will be accom-
panied by the federal funds necessary to
implement them is presently unclear.”
Untrue. The answer is very clear: The neces-
sary funds will not be available. 
A report by the National Academy of
Sciences’ Strategic Educational Research
Partnership, chaired by respected business
leader John Reed, notes that 47.6 million
American children are in schools deemed
“inadequate” under No Child Left Behind.
Without needed resources, these children will,
indeed, be left behind.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For 60 years, the Committee for Economic
Development has been a respected influence
on the formation of business and public
policy. CED is devoted to these two objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contrib-
ute to preserving and strengthening our free society,
achieving steady economic growth at high employ-
ment and reasonably stable prices, increasing pro-
ductivity and living standards, providing greater
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and
improving the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, government,
and education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
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foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
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